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*  1.  Introduction.  The  prevailing  conception  of deixis  is  oriented 
to the  idea  of  'concrete'  physical  and  perceptual  characteristics  of 
the situation of speech. 
Signs  standardly  adduced  as typical deictics are l, you,  here,  now, 
this,  that. land you  are  defined  as  meaning  "the  person  producing  the 
utterance in  question"  and  "the  person  spoken  to" ,  here  and  now  as 
meaning  "where  the  speaker is at utterance time"  and  "at  the  moment 
the  utterance is  made"  (also,  "at  the  place/time  of  the  speech 
exchange");  similarly,  the  meanings  of this and  that  are  as  a  rule 
defined  via  proximity  to speaker's  physical  IDeation.  The  elements 
used  in  such  definitions form  the  conceptual framework  of most  of  the 
general  characterisations of deixis  in the literature.  The  following , 
much-echoed,  definition is an  example: 
"By  deixis is meant  the  IDeation  and  identification  of  persons, 
objects,  events,  processes  and  activities being  talked  about,  or 
referred to,  in relation to the spatiotemporal  context  created  and 
sustained  by  the  act of utterance  and  the  participation  in  it, 
typicallY'10f a  single speaker  and  at least one  addressee."  (Lyons 
1977: 637 .) 
The  emphasis  on  concrete  speech-situation  "coordinates"  is  also 
reflected in  the widely-held  assumption  of an  essential dependence  of 
deixis  on  face-to-face  communication ,  on  pointing,  on  "audio-visual 
monitoring" ,  on  interactants'  physical  locations.  Related  to  this 
concretely-oriented  view  is the  widespread  equation  of the  concept  of 
deixis with that of demonstrativity. 
There  is much  in the literature,  of course,  that  goes  far  beyond 
this framework .  A great  variety of elements,  mostly  withvery abstract 
meanings,  have  been  found  to share  deictic  characteristics  although 
they  do  not fit into the  personnel-place-time-of-utterance schema .  The 
adequacy  of  that  schema  is  also  ca lIed  into  question  by  many 
observations to the effect that the  use  of such  standard  deictics  as 
here,  now,  this,  that  cannot really  be  accounted  for  on  its basis,  and 
by  the  far-reaching  possibilities of orienting'deictics  to  reference 
points  in situations other than the  situation of speech,  to  'deictic 
centers'  other than  the  speaker.  A few  examples: 
Many  types  of signs  beyond  the  classical person-,  place-,  and  time-
related  ones  have  over the  course  of time  been  judged to  be  deictic, 
either  by  single authors  or  more  generally.  To  list but  a  selection: 
articles,  mood,  voice,  verbal  aspect,  sentence  accent,  word  order 
variation,  conj unctions,  "discourse  markers"  (oh,  weIl,  anyway, 
besides,  in  conclusion),  and  even  stylistic register.2  We  have  to  do 
here  with  quite abstract meanings  that cannot,  for the  most  part,  be 2 
related to the classical triad of reference  point types,  or in  unclear 
ways  only  (mood,  e.g.,  is  thought  by  most  authors  to  be  in  a 
particularly  narrow  relation  to  the  speaker;  but  its  semantic 
orientation to the  "person  coordinate"  cannot  be  of the  same  type  as 
that of the first and  second  person  pronouns) .  In  fact,  new  "kinds"  of 
deixis  beyond  person,  place,  time  have  been  established:  e.g.  social, 
discourse,  emotional  deixis,  as  weIl  as  new  types  of  reference  point 
as  abstract as  socially-defined  "normal  states"  and  other  general  or 
ad-hoc  norms. 3 
As  to the  definition of basic  deictic  meanings,  the  observation 
that here  and  now  do  not  necessarily  refer  to  place  and  time  of 
utterance  goes  back  at least as  far  as  BÜhler:4 
"(Jetzt  ebenso  wie  hier) ...  kann,  je  nach  dem  mitgedachten 
Nichtmehrjetzt  eine  kleinere  oder  auch  beliebig  große  Ausdehnung 
annehmen .  So  wie  ein gläubiger Christ  hier  sagt  und  das  ganze 
Diesseits  (die  Erdoberfläche  oder  mehr--noch)  einschließt,  mag 
einer,  der  in  geologischen  Zeitmaßen  denkt,  in  ein  'jetzt'  die 
ganze  Periode  nach  der  letzten  Eiszeit  einschließen."  (Bühler 
1934/1982:132 .) 
"(Now  just like  here) ...  can  take  a  smaller  extension  or  one 
expanded  at will,  depending  on  the  no-longer-now  one  is  thinking 
of.  Just  as  a  pious  Christian will say  here  and  include  all  of 
this world  (the  surface  of  the  earth--oT  even  more),  someone 
thinking  of time  in  geological  dimensions  may  include  in  a  ' now ' 
all time  since the last glacial period." 
For  analogous  'extensibility'  of this  and  that,  cf.  Talmy: 
"Notions that might  at first  be  ascribed to  such  deictics,  such  as 
of distance  or  perhaps  size,  prove  not to apply,  on  the  evidence 
of senten  ce  pairs like  (2): 
(2)  a.  This  speck is smaller than that speck. 
b.  This  planet is smaller than that planet. 
The  scenes referred to  by  (2a)  and  (b)  differ  greatly,  involving 
ti  ny  objects millimeters  apart  or  huge  objects  parsecs  aparts ... 
the  scenes '  differences  as  to the magnitude  of  size  or  distance 
must  arise from  the  lexical elements,  they  cannot  be  traced to the 
deictics ...  "(1968 :168f.) 
No  more  than  absolute  distance,  relative  distance  is  a  sufficient 
criterion: 
" ... what  'proximal'  and  'non-proximal' 
context.  It is apparently  possible to  say 
when  she is at a  distance of 100  metres, 
'there is  my  mother',  when  she  is at  a 
(Klein  1982:166.) 
mean .. . depends  on  the 
'here  comes  my  mother', 
but  one  can  also  say 
distance  of  10  metres. 
For  Latin  with its three-term  system  of demonstratives,  criteria of 
relative distance  were  refuted  almost fifty years  ago ,  on  the  basis  of 
detailed  analyses  of  usage  (Keller  1946,  whose  findings  are 
incorporated in  a  reference  grammar  like Hofmann/Szantyr  1965) .5 
Uses  like the  following,  where  the reference is much  too  abstract to  be  related to space  or time  in  any  literal sense,  are well-known: 
(1)  (After  a  discussion  of impasses  in  gluon  theory:)  In  books  it 
says that science is simple:  you  make  up  a  theory  and  compare  it  to 
experiment;  if the theory  doesn't work,  you  throw it away  and  make  a 
new  theory.  Here  we  have  adefinite  theory  and  hundreds  of 
experiments,  but  we  can't compare  them!  (Feynman  1985 :139). 
(2)  As  we  shall see,  the  concept  of time  has  no  meaning  before  the 
beginning  of  the  universe.  This  was  first  pointed  out  by  St. 
Augustine.  (Hawking  1988:9.) 
(3)  (After  a  one-page  exposition  of  how  the  number  of  extant 
Rembrandts  believed to  be  authentic  has  been  drastically  reduced  by 
the  Amsterdam  Rembrandt  Research  Project,  and  the  arguments  on  which 
this is founded:)  Who ,  then,  executed  all  the  pictures  which  the 
project  has  deleted?  (The  Times  Saturday  Review,  3/14/1992) 
Here  in  (1)  and  this in  (2)  can  hardly  be  treated  as  quasi-pointing to 
locations  in  the  discourse  (like  above,  below);  the  contents 
themselves  must  be  considered.  (Klein  1978:23f  speaks  of  orientation 
in  an  actional deictic field,  "Handlungsraum",  in  view  of  uses  like 
(1) .  For  diverse  'abstract'  uses  of then,  see  Schiffrin 1991.) 
Analyses  along  the  lines  of  the  standard  conception  regularly 
acknowledge  the  existence  of  deviations  from  the  assumed  basic 
meanings.6  One  traditional  solution  attributes  them  to  speaker's 
"subjectivity",  or to  differences  between  "physical"  and  "psycho-
logical"  space  or time;  in  a  similar vein,  metaphorical  extensions  may 
be  said to  be  at play,  or  a  distinction  between  prototypical  and 
non-prototypical  meanings  invoked.7  Quite  apart  from  the  question  of 
the relative merits  of these  explanatory  principles,  which  I  do  not 
wish  to  discuss  here,  the  problem  with all such  accounts  is  that  the 
definitions  of the  assumed  basic meanings  themselves  are  founded  on 
axiom  rather than  analysis  of situated  use.  The  logical  alternative, 
of course,  is to set out for  more  abstract and  comprehensive  meaning 
definitions  from  the  start.  In  fact,  a  number  of  recent, 
discourse-oriented,  treatments  of the  demonstratives  proceed this way; 
they  view  those  elements  as  processing  instructions rather than  signs 
with  inherently spatial denotation  (Isard  1975,  Hawkins  1978,  Kirsner 
1979,  Linde  1979 ,  Ehlich  1982 .)8 
Finally,  flexibility  in the  choice  of reference  points. 
analysis  has  long  operated  with  reference  points  other 
situation  of  speech  or  the  speaker.  One  classical 
Linguistic 
than  the 
domain  is 
tense/aspect analysis.  The  traditional notion  of relative tense,  e.g. , 
is  based  on  non-speech-situational  reference  points;  Reichenbach's 
influential analysis  quite  naturally  operates  with  them.  Tense/aspect 
forms  that  do  not  exhibit  morphology  marking  them  as  'relative' 4 
nevertheless  are  not  limited to  speech-situational  reference  points: 
past-,  perfect- and  aoristlike meanings,  e.g.,  quite  commonly  take 
orientation points  in  future  situations: 
(4)  German:  Ruf'  mich  an,  wenn  du  auf  dem  Dekanat  warst.  (Phone  me 
when  you  (lit.:)  were  at the  Dean 's  office) .  Cf .  Latze11974:287f. 
(5)  German:  Morgen  um  die  Zeit  habe  ich  schon  abgegeben.  (Tomorrow 
this time  I  (lit. :)  have  turned in already  <scil.  the  paper») .  Cf. 
Latzel  ibid.,-COmrie  1985 :31 . 
(6)  Braz.Port. :  (At  a  wedding  invitation,  around  8.30h  p.m. :) ...  por 
volta  das  onze  horas  provavelmente ja acabou.  (Around  11h,  it probably 
(lit.)  finished/has  finished  already) .  Cf .  Comrie  ibid. 
Clearly,  then,  such  deictic  elements  are  underdefined  if  only 
orientation to the  'moment  of speech'  is taken  into account.9  The  same 
goes,  mutatis  mutandis,  for the reference  points  of  motion  verbs  or 
directional affixes  and  for those  of locationals like right  and  left. 
For  motion  verbs,  one  remembers  Fillmore's  analyses  of  come,  with 
options  of reference  point  such  as  the  following: 
if  WE  is 
exclusive 
or  you 
"  WE  WILL COME  TO  THE  SHOP  TONIGHT ...  is  appropriate 
inclusive  and  you  and  I  are at the  shop  now,  or if WE  is 
and  either I  am  at the  shop  now,  you  are at the  shop  now, 
will be  at the  shop  tonight." 
" ...  WILL  HE  COME  THERE  TOMORROW  NIGHT?  supposes  either that  I  will 
be  there tomorrow  nig~E'  or that  you  will  be  there tomorrow  night." 
(Fillmore  1966:220.) 
That rightjleft orientation is not  a  matter of fixed  reference  points 
is  evident.  Speaker's  orientation  cannot  be  used  as  point  of 
departure,  e.g. ,  if the  hearer's  is relevantly different  (cf.  Fillmore 
1975 :18) . 
The  practice of defining  deictic meanings  uniformly  via  orientation 
to  speakerjsituation  of  speech  must  be  reexamined,  then.  The 
prevailing  idea  of an  essentially  static  relation  between  deictic 
meanings  and  corresponding  "coordinates"  of the  speech  situation is in 
conflict also  with  the  many  observations  in the literature  concerning 
the  exploitation  of shifts of perspective  - of reference  point,  that 
11  is - for  politeness  and  for the manipulation  of narrative  empathy . 
Well-known  as all such  facts  are,  and  much  as  they  are  listed  in 
standard  treatments,  t he  idea  that  deixis  proper  resides  in 
orient  at  ion  to  the  concrete  speech-situation setting remains  basically 
untouched .  Mostly ,  the  phenomena  mentioned  are treated  under  special 
rubrics  such  as  deictic  projection,  relativised  deixis,  Deixis  am 
Phantasma,  but  they  also tend to  be  kept  away  from  the rest of  deixis 
there.  In fact,  they  are  in  general treated  as  marginal  and  somewhat 5 
deviant;  a  frequent  practice  consists  in  dubbing  orientation  to 
reference  points  other than  the  canonised  ones  non-deictic  use.  But 
since the characteristic orientation of a  deictic remains  the  same  no 
matter where  its reference  point,  in  one  sense this amounts  to  calling 
deixis  non-deictic  unless  the  reference  points  conform  to  set 
requirements.  In the  following  quotation  from  Fillmore  1982,  this 
impasse is articulated quite  clearly.  In  commenting  on  the  use  of ago 
(as  against  more  expected  earlier)  in  a  sentence  like  Several  years 
aga,  he  had  lived  near the  beach,  the  author  says: 
" .. . what  is  being  presented is the  inner  experience of  a  central 
character,  the  'he'  of the  passage.  That is the  kind  of transfer  I 
have  in  mind  when  I  speak  of a  basically deictic  word  being  used 
'non-deictically'.  The  characterisation is potentially  misleading, 
since it is precisely the  deictic effect associated with  the  word 
which  is responsible for the  communicated  'point  of  view'.  What 
justifies me  in  describing it  as  non-deictic  is  its  not  being 
anchored  in the  current  speech  event,  the  eve~2  in  which  the 
utterance is produced."  (1982 :38 ;  emphasis  mine .) 
To  sum  up,  a  wealth  of  existing  observations  has  remained 
unintegrated  within  the  overall  theory,  which  is  dominated  by 
.  .  l '  t '  13  concretlstlc conceptua  lsa  lon. 6 
2.  "Here"  and  "now".  Consider the  following  examples,  both  from 
"canonical",  face-to-face  utterance situations: 
(7)  Arun,  an  Indian  living in  Hamburg,  is  back 
India.  It is early  November .  A German  friend,  Helga, 
walk  on  the  banks  of the  EIbe .  They  are  greeted  by 
there.  Helga  turns to  Arun  with  a  smile  and  says: 
Kalt  hier,  nicht?  (Chilly  here,  eh?) 
from  a  trip  to 
has  proposed  a 
quite  a  breeze 
(8)  On  the  no .26  bus,  at the terminal station.  It is 6  minutes  past 
10.  The  driver  has  been  sitting near  a  passenger,  chatting.  He  gets  up 
and  goes  toward  his  own  seato 
Driver:  So,  dann  woll'n  wer  mal  langsam  losjuckeIn 
Passenger:  3  Minuten  ham  Se  ja noch 
Driver:  6 is es,  da  fahrn  wer 
Passenger:  Ach  so,  ich  dachte,  9 
Driver:  Nee,  6.  Sonst  fuhrn  wer  4,  jetzt fahrn  wer  6.  Damit  die 
16  Anschluß  hat  am  Theaterplatz. 
(Driver:  Alright,  so  let's get  going 
Passenger:  You  have  3  minutes left  .. . 
Driver:  It's 06,  that's  when  we  leave 
Passenger:  Oh,  I  thought  <we  leave>  09 
Driver:  Naw,  06 .  We  used  to leave <lit.: 
04 ,  now  we  leave  06 .  So  that  no. 
before,  we  left>  at 
16  can  connect  with  us 
at Theatre  Square.) 
It certainly  does  not  make  sense to  assume  that  Helga,  in  (7) ,  is 
referring to  her  physical location at  the  moment  of  utterance,  in 
contradistinction  to  her  interlocutor's.  Under  a  more  liberal 
definition,  she  might  be  said to  be  referring to their joint  location 
at utterance time;  but  how  are  we  to delimit that  place?  Since  they 
are  walking,  does  here refer to the  exact  place  reached  at  utterance 
time  (however  that is delimited  in turn)? In  (8),  although  the  precise 
time  at which  the  dialogue takes  place  has  some  relevance  to  the 
concerns  addressed,  it is impossible to interpret the  now  as referring 
to that time. 
What  an  interlocutor  needs  for  adequate  interpretation  of  the 
deictics  goes  far  beyond  knowledge  of  literal  utterance  time  and 
place.  Much  inferential activity is needed. 
The  central task is to find  out  what  the  speaker is getting  at with 
the  utterance,  its intended  relevance.  Is  Helga,  in  (7),  drawing 
attention to the windiness  of the  place  they 
outing,  e.g.,  or  is  the  remark  intended 
have  chosen  for  their 
as  a  starter  for  a 
conversation  about  Arun 's  re  cent  change  of  worlds?  The  decision  is 
interactionally consequential,  of course;  it will  have  to  be  based  on, 
inter alia,  a  consideration of the topics  expectable  between  the  two, 
Helga's  conversational style,  intonational  cues.  Depending  on  the 
issue  Arun  decides  she  lS  addressing,  he  will  have  to  examine 7 
order  to  determine  the  different  shared-knowledge  contexts  in 
reference  of the  "here":  under  the first  interpretation,  a  possible 
implicit term  of contrast might  be  less windy  close-by  places  where 
one  could  walk  more  comfortably,  and  the  "here"  would  be  equivalent 
to,  roughly,  "on  the river-bank";  under  the  second,  the  "here"  would 
be  in implicit contrast to the  continent  Arun  has  just returned  from, 
and  equivalent,  roughly,  to  "in winterly  Northern  Europe".  (Arun  in 
fact  chose  the  second  interpretation,  he  said  "Oh,  l 've  come  to  like 
it",  and  the  conversation  turned to his trip,  so  probably  he  had  hit 
upon  Helga's  intention.  Had  he  answered  instead:  "we  can  go  to a  more 
protected  place",  he  might  well  have  produced  a  momentary 
disenchantment,  having  chosen  an  over-pedestrian interpretation.) 
Likewise  for the  "now"  in  (8) :  to  determine  its  reference,  the 
hearer  has  to  activate  relevant  shared-knowledge  contexts.  The 
utterance  containing  the  "now"  (actually,  "now"  itself,  in  this 
context)  presupposes  a  change  of bus  schedules.  On  the  basis  of  more 
general rules  of conversation,  the  hearer  can  infer that  the  speaker 
is not referring,  with  his mention  of an  outdated  schedule,  to astate 
of affairs that obtained  many  years  and  many  changes  of schedule  ago; 
the trivial difference would  hardly  warrant 
least in the  given  context.1  So  the  inferred 
such  historiography, 
reference  of  "now" 
at 
is 
"since the last or  some  reasonably  re  cent  change  of schedule".  lf  the 
listener actually  knows  more  about those  changes  (the last  change  of 
schedules  had  taken  place  some  two  months  ago,  but  the  particular 
change  mentioned  went  back  to the last but  one,  half  a  year  before 
that) ,  he  may  be  able to determine  the  extension  of  the  "now"  in  a 
more  calendrically precise sense,  if  need  be,  or  at  least  decide 
between  the alternatives  "since  the  last  change"  and  "since  some 
recent  change";  otherwise,  interpretation  may  well  stop at  the  point 
reached  without  any  omission  of contextually relevant  information.2 
A few  more  examples: 
(9)  A and  B,  who  live  in  Göttingen,  are  on  their  way 
restaurant outside town  - in  fact,  they  have  just  left  the 
properly  speaking.  Over  the radio,  they  hear  a  song  by  Purcell: 
A:  Das  ist das  Stafford-Ensemble. 
B:  Ach  - die  gerade  hier gesungen  haben ! 
(A:  That's the  Stafford  ensembl e.  B:  Oh,  the  people  who  just 
here!) 
to  a 
town 
sang 
(10)  A meets  B,  the  daughter  of a  former  neighbour  who  has  moved  to 
a  suburb  from  a  relatively central residential area  of Göttingen  .  The 
encounter is at a  bus  stop  in the  old  common  neighbourhood .  B explains 
she still goes  to  her  old  school  (which  is in town ,  but  closer to  the 8 
old  neighbourhood  than to the  new  one :) 
A:  .. . und  auch  außerdem  hab '  ich  hier  noch  viel:  Basketball, 
Flöten ...  ( ...  and  besides,  I  still  have  many  other  things  her e: 
basketball,  flute-lessons .. . ) 
(11)  At  a  large carnival party  that  takes  place  over  the  two 
floors  of a  student  dormitory.  A und  B are  in  a  medium-sized  room  on 
the  upper  floor:) 
A:  Gott,  was  für 'n  Betrieb. 
B:  Was  meinste,  wieviele  Leute  hier  wohl  sind? 
A:  Weiß  nicht,  vielleicht fünf,  sechs  hundert? 
(A :  God ,  what  a  crowd 
B:  How  many  people  do  you  think  (lit.)  are  here? 
A:  WeIl  - five  or six  hundred  perhaps?) 
(12)  (A 's  son,  a  civil servant,  has  been  transferred to the 
embassy  in  an  Eastern  European  country.  He  has  been  there  for 
weeks  and  has  just been  telling his  mother,  on  the  phone ,  how  he 
it.  A gi ves  a  vivid  picture of his first impressi ons .. . ) 
German 
a  few 
l i kes 
A:  ...  und  jetzt haben  sie  'n  Botschafter,  der ist so  50  Jahre  alt, 
der  wird  jetzt 1  abgelöst  wir  hatten  da  glaub'  ich  keinen 
Botschafter,  der  Ostblock  hatte  nur  einen,  also  Ostdeutschland,  und 
die werden  jetzt 2  alle abgezogen  und  ausgetauscht.  Und  j etzt 3  käme  'ne 
Botschafterin,  so  ungefähr  60  Jahre,  sagt er,  da  müssen  wir  uns  erst 
drauf einstellen ... 
(A :  ...  now,  they  have  an  ambassador  who  is around  fifty,  and  he 's 
now1  going  to  be  exchanged ... I  don 't  think  we  (the interlocutors  are 
the 
all 
from  and  in  Western  Germany)  had  an  ambassador  there,  it 's  only 
Eastern  bloc that  had  one ,  I  mean  Eastern  Germany,  and  those  are 
being  ca lIed  back  and  exchanged  now2.  And  now3  <he  says>  a  woman 
ambassador  is coming,  some  60  years  old,  he  says,  we  have  to  get  used 
to that thought ... 
(A  little later,  A menti ons  t he  son 's  girl-friend.) 
B:  ...  und  wo  ist di e  jetzt 4  .. .  während  er ...  die ist nicht mit,  ne? 
A:  Neiiin.  Aber  sie fliegt  hin. 
(B : . . . and  where  is she  now4  .. . while  he ...  she  has  not  gone  with  him, 
has  she?  A:  Oh  no .  But  she'll go  to visit him .) 
(13)  Stefan,  who  lives in  Hanover,  some  100  km  from  Göttingen,  has 
promised  Daniel,  who  lives  in  Göttingen,  a  lift  to  Stuttgart.  They 
have  agreed that Stefan will  start  from  Hannover  around  noon,  on 
Sunday ,  and  pick  Daniel up  in Göttingen  in  the  early  afternoon.  On 
Sunday  morning  at 8.30 ,  Stefan  is  on  the  phone .  Daniel's  mother 
answers. 
S:  Kann  ich  bitte Daniel  sprechen? 
A:  Der  schläft  noch ,  ich will ihn  mal  holen. 
S:  Nein,  sagen  Sie  ihm ,  daß  ich  jetzt  von  Hannover  losfahre.  Ich 
rufe  ihn  dann  an ,  wenn  ich  in Göttingen  angekommen  bin. 
(  S:  M ay  I  speak to  Daniel please? 
A:  He ' s  still asleep ;  let me  go  and  get  him . 
S:  N o,  tell him  l 'm leaving  from  Hannover  now.  1'11  phone  him 
when  I  arrive in  Göttingen.) 
(After  some  repeating  of details for  A,  who  had  not  known  of  the 
scheme  and  wishes  to  make  sure  she  transmits the  r i ght thing:) 
S:  Also  ich  fahr '  in  'ner  halben  Stunde hier los,  und  ruf'  dann 
an . 
(S :  So  1'11  start from  here  in half  an  hour,  and  1'11  phone  him.) 
For  (9) ,  the rel evant  shared  knowledge  yields  "at  the  Göttingen Handel  Festival  (some  ten  days  ago)"  as  the  intended reference  of 
hier;  for  (10),  roughly,  "around  the  neighbourhood  where  we  have 
met".  In  a  concretistic interpretation,  we  would  have  to  say  that 
"here"  in  (9)  refers to Göttingen  (or  even  to the  concert  hall 
the  ensemble  performed?),  and  thus,  to  where  the  interlocutors 








of that town,  a  section related to the  locus  of  the  utterance  this 
time,  but  in  a  somewhat  unclear way.  Hardly  an  enlightening  account. 
What  actually  determines the references is relevant relations  in  the 
shared-knowledge  contexts  addressed.  (9)  evokes  a  context to  do  'with 
access,  in  a  semiprovincial  town,  to  performances  of  renowned 
musicians;  potential terms  of contrast are  European  capitals,  diverse 
festivals  of ancient  music,  England  as  the  home  country  of  this 
particular ensemble,  etc.;  "here"  is "the  place  where  we  are"  on  this 
dimension  of  contrast.  In  the  interpretation  of  (10),  a 
shared-knowledge  ingredient that permits  the  speaker to  subsume  both 
the  school,  which  is not  in the  neighbourhood,  and  the  other  places 
mentioned,  which  are,  under  "here"  is the  fact  that  the  school  in 
question is easily reached  by  bus  from  this  neighbourhood,  so  that 
many  inhabitants  send  their children there,  while it would  not  be  the 
first choice  for  inhabitants of the  new  neighbourhood.  The  relevant 
terms  of contrast,  then,  are  each  of  the  neighbourhoods  plus  the 
institutions in town  typically frequented  by  its inhabitants or,  more 
specifically,  by  its teenagers.  Hier  in  (11)  was  obviously  intended 
and  actually taken  by  the  addressee  - to refer to the social  occasion 
(and  thus,  implicitly,  to all the  rooms  in the  building  occupied  by 
it),  not to the particular room  the interlocutors  were  in;  although 
the latter would  have  been  a  possible interpretation  under  appropriate 
conditions  of relevance,  e.g.  if the  two  had  just  come  from  a  much 
less  crowded  room  into the  present  one. 
In  (12),  the  first  and  third  bold-face, jetzt  belong  to  the 
rendering  of the  son's situation and  reflect his  point  of  view  (cf. 
the transition,  in  the  sentence  with jetzt3,  from  indirect  reported 
speech  - signalIed  by  the  subjunctive  käme  - to direct quotation);  the 
second  is  part  of  an  explanatory  parenthesis  and  reflects  the 
perspective  of the  immediate  interlocutors,  as  does  the fourth.3  None 
of them  is coreferential with  any  of  the  others  in  a  metrically 
temporal  sense.  Der  wird jetzt1  abgelöst  introduces  a  situation  of 
transition  and  expectation  at  the  new  working  place,  and  the 
contribution of the  "now"  almost  reduces to  "there is relevant  change 10 
ahead" .  For  now2,  the  relevant  shared-knowledge  context is constituted 
by  the  ongoing  political reorganisation  following  the reunification of 
Germany:  "now  that the  GOR  is  no  longer  a  country  of  its  own". 
Metrically  speaking,  the  period  referred to  here  must  be  considered 
much  more  extended  than that of  now1;  but  such  comparison  is  awkward , 
because,  functionally,  very  different  planes  are  involved:  a  spotlight 
on  a  transitory situation,  through  participants'  eyes,  with  'forward 
tension' ,  on  the  one  hand ,  and  an  explanatory  comment  concerning  a 
temporary  order of things,  on  the  other.  In  neither  case  is  exact 
temporal  delimitation at issue,  which  makes  comparison  under  this 
angle  appear  beside the  point.  Now3  might  be  said to  cover  the  same 
time  span  as  now1,  from  an  extraneous  point of  view.  Yet ,  looking  more 
closely,  we  see that the  expressions  are  chosen  from  different  angles 
in the  two  statements;  the first  "now"  is delimited  by  the  imminent 
change,  the  second  almost  the  other way  around,  "now"  being  equivalent 
to  something  like  "when  t he  present  ambassador  goes"  (note  that  this 
jetzt is stressed) .  Now4,  finally ,  refers to the  whole  period  of  the 
son 's  projected  absence  from  Göttingen,  as  B actually  makes  explicit 
("while  he ...  ",  which  says  enough,  in  the  context) .  The  constant 
meaning  of jetzt/"now"  over all the  uses  is  "since and/or  up  to  the 
last/next relevant  change";  wh at is relevant  change  is  determined  by 
the  context  addressed,  as  are the strictly temporal  boundaries,  to the 
extent that t here is an  ad-hoc  i nterest in  determining  them  with  any 
precision.  (13)  is another  example  of the  essential  abstractness  of 
the  meaning  of the  deictic.  There  would  be  no  point in accusing  Stefan 
of a  contradiction  between  "I  am  starting  now"  and  "I  am  starting  in 
half an  hour",  which  would  contradict each  other,  of course,  if  "now" 
meant  "at  the  moment  of  utterance".  The  relevant  'context  for 
comprehension '  (with  a  term  from  Sperber/Wilson  1986)  is  constituted 
by  Stefan  and  Oaniel's  earlier agreement,  and  the  relevant  term  of 
contrast for the  interpretation of the  "now"  is  "around  noon";  this 
plus the time  of the  call roughly  delimit its  reference  to  "in  the 
early  part of the morning"  (the relevant  change  being  defined  by  the 
portions  we  divide  days  into).  Interestingly,  when  A woke  Oaniel  and 
delivered the  message  (using jetzt/"now"),  Oaniel  immediately  reacted 
to its practical implication  of having  to  get  up,  by  doing  so,  but 
after some  time  asked:  wann  fährt  er los?  "when  is  he  leaving?":  he 
had  interpreted the  "now"  in the  sense  sketched  but  was  now  figuring 
out  his  programme  in more  detail and  wanted  additional  information; 
again,  the  question  would  not  make  sense if "now"  meant  "at  utterance 11 
time." 
So  far  in  our  examples,  "here"  has  been  equivalent to  "where  we  are 
(on  the thematically relevant  dimension  of localisation)"  rather  than 
"where  I  am",  i .e.  than  to  "at  speaker's  location".  Meaning 
definitions in the literature are  based  either on  speaker' s  location 
or  on  that of the  speech  exchange,  but there is no  clear opinion  as  to 
which  formulation  is more  adequate4;  the  first  one  is,  of  course, 
presupposed  by  the frequent  parlance  of deictic  "egocentricity". 
The  examples  so  far  lend  no  support to  "speaker's  location",  but 
they  also  exclude  "at  the  place  of  the  speech  exchange"  as  an 
appropriate  meaning  definition.  The  function  of here  lS  to  indicate 
t he  'given'  position  on  any  dimension  of  localisation  that  may  be 
relevant at the  moment .  The  place  where  we  are  speaking,  and ,  a 
fortiori,  literal physical location is not  too  frequently  relevant  to 
what  we  are  saying.  But  there  are  cases  when  they  are,  of course,  and 
it is in those  ca ses that  here  may  refer,  by  the  principle  just 
stated,  to  wh at might  be  labelIed  the  place  where  the  utterance takes 
place,  or  even  interactants'  physical location. 
(14)  +  (In  a  bar:)  It's  impossible to talk  here,  l et's  go  somewhere 
quieter. 
(15)  +  (Hikers  on  a  warm  summer  day  having  a  rest  under  a  tree)  How 
nice  and  shady  here! 
cf.  also  ex.  (17)  below.  ("+"  marks  constructed  examples .) 
But  note that although  (14)  is overtly  about  a  place  for  speaking,  t he 
relevant  dimension  of contrast will  be  constituted  by  the  bar  where 
the interactants  are  as  against  other  places  to  'go  to'  on  this 
occasion:  other  bars,  a  restaurant,  the  park  (not  just  any  quiet 
spot) :  socially and  interactionall y  constituted places.  Here  is  used 
to  designate the  place  not  in its capa city  as  locus  of  the  speech 
exchange,  but  as  the  place  "where  we  are"  against this  background.  The 
here  in  (15) ,  too,  although  it  might  be  seid  to  come  close  to 
referring to interactants'  physical location,  is really delimited,  to 
the  degree  that such .delimitation might  become  relevant,  by  t he  reach 
of the  tree's  shade.  We  are,  actually,  not  necessarily  located 
physically within  the  spaces  we  refer to  as  here: 
(15a)  +  H ere is a  nice  spot for  us  to rest,  said while  the  hikers 
are  approaching  the tree,  but  are still some  distance  away  from  it. 
(15b)  (Father,  mother  and  six-year  old 
stopped at a  shop-window  richly  decorated 
wear.)  Mama,  was  möchtest  du  hiervon  haben? 
like to  have  of this  - <lit.  hereof>?) 
son .  The  parents  have 
with  folk-style  women's 
(Mommy ,  wh at  would  you 1 2 
This is all the  more  true when  the  intended  "where  we  are"  is  an 
obviously  abstract  spaee  (I  say  "obviously"  beeause  ultimately  any 
plaee  or  spaee  we  refer  to  linguistieally  is  abstract  sinee 
soeiallyjinteraetionally defined  on  a  relational basis),  as  in  example 
(1),  p.  3,  or,  for that matter,  in  I  herewith  deelare  the  meeting 
opened .  I  don 't  treat this large  eategory  of use  separately  in  this 
paper. 
In  eonversation,  questions  such  as  "what  do  you  mean  'here'?" 
sometimes  oeeur  (they  shouldn't, if the  usual meaning  definition  were 
eorreet);  one  ean  use  such  a  question  for  silent  tests  on  examples, 
and  it will  beeome  elear that a  eontextually  adequate  answer,  i.e.  a 
paraphrase  as  might  be  formulated  by  the  speaker,  would  hardly  ever 
refer to the  eurrent  speech  aetivity and  seldom  to  physieal  loeation 
in astriet sense.  I  stress this beeause  our  deseriptive  expressions 
in  this  domain  invite  equivoeation  and  hypostatisation. 
"Speaker'sjinteraetants'  loeation",  e.g. ,  seems  a  natural  enough 
seientifie nominalisation  to  use  instead  of  "where  speaker is",  "where 
interactants  are".  From  there,  the  step  is  short,  in  a 
physieally-oriented  frame  of mind,  to overlooking that  any  such  "where 
speaker is"  is thematieally  defined  and  to  interpreting  "speaker's 
loeation"  in the  sense,  more  or less,  of  "place  oeeupied  by  speaker's 
body".5  (Cf.  also  seetion  4) . 
It is also worth  noting that as  far  as  'loealising'  in  astriet 
sense is eoneerned,  the  here  in  (14),  just  like  that  in  (7)" ,  p.6, 
might  have  been  omitted;  in either ease,  there is  not  mueh  possible 
doubt  as to what  plaee the  statement is  being  made  about.  The  point of 
using  here,  in  either ease,  is not  so  mueh  to  indieate  the  loeation 
the  predieation  applies to  as  to  evoke  plaees  that  eontrast  with 
"where  we  are",  on  the  relevant  dimension  (noisiness,  eoldness) . 
Spatial expressions  are all too  often  eonstrued  as  if  their  main  if 
not  sole  use  were  in  answering  "where?"  questions.6 
But  now,  how  about  this  "where  we  are"  rather than  "where  I  am"?  In 
the  examples  so  far,  the  speaker  was  elearly  not  talking  about  his 
loeation to the  exelusion  of the  addressee's .  Things  are  different  in 
ca ses like: 
(16)  +  Come  over  here,  I  want  to show  you  something. 
(17)  +  (You  wish  to indieate to  someone  the  preeise 
a  small  piece  of furniture is to  go,  so  you  step  over 
and  say:)  H ere is where  I  want  it. 
What  happens  here  is  that  the  eoneerns  addressed 
loeation 




dissociate'  speaker's  l ocation  from  hearer's .  Physically  speaking, 
those  locations  never  coincide  anyway,  but  most  of the  time  this  is 
thematically irrelevant.  When  it is relevant,  it is speaker's  location 
that  counts  as  the  'given'  one,  on  the  relevant  dimension  of 
localisation.  (Again,  the locations indicated  are at issue  not  in  the 
ca pa city of being  place  of utterance,  but  of being  where  speaker  is; 
in  (17) ,  a  small  paper-ball thrown to the  place in  question  might  have 
done  the  same  service  as  the  displacement.) 
Much  t he  same  goes  for  situations  such  as  letter-writing  or 
long-distance  calls,  except that the  differ ence  in  factual  location is 
probably  somewhat  more  prone  to  become  thematic.  Long-distance 
communication  does  not  automatically  dissociate  speaker's  and 
addressee's  locations  as  far  as  t he  use  of  deictics  is  concerned; 
again,  it is a  matter of themati c  context.  A and  B may  be  speaking,  in 
a  long-distance  conversation,  say,  between  Munich  and  London ,  about 
the  destruction  of traditi onal  agricultural structures  in  Africa  for 
the  sake  of export trade,  one  of t hem  remarking 
(18)  ...  nur  damit  es  hi er im  Dezember  Erdbeeren  gibt  ( ...  just  in 
order for there to  be  strawberries in  December  here) , 
where  "here"  refers to  a  climatic  zone  including 
addressee's  places.  It is only  when  t he  concern 
both  speaker's 
addressed 
and 
speaker's  and  hearer's  locations them atically that here will 
separates 
have  to 
be  heard  as  "where  I  am".  Thus  A,  in  Munich ,  may  write to  B,  who  live~ 
in  Nuremberg  but is thinking  of moving  to M unich: 
(19) ...  Der  Wohnungsmarkt  ist  al lerdings  katastrophal  hier  (the 
market  for flats is catastrophic here,  though) . 
One  might  be  tempted  to  conclude  t hat since  in  case  of conflict  it 
is speaker' s  location that wins  out,  t his is the  basic criterion after 
all;  where  there is no  conflict,  t he  interpretation  "wher e  we  are" 
would  arise  by  simple  inclusion  of addressee's  l ocation.  But  this  is 
geometrically-oriented thinking  severed  from  questions  of  communica-
tional relevance.  In  t he  bulk  of cases,  i .e.  those  where  we  would 
paraphrase  via  "where  we  are",  speaker's  position  on  the  rel evant 
dimension  cannot  be  relevantly  distingui shed  from  addressee's .  The 
functional motivation  for treat ing  speaker's  position  as  'given'  (i.e. 
"here")  when  it  lS  thematicall y  separated  from  addressee's  seems 
clear.  Some  reference  point is needed,  or  el se 
would  be  impossible.  A  convent ion  different 
speaker refer to  his  own  position  as  "here"  is 
deictic 
from  that 
hardly 
formulation 
of  having 
conceivable. 14 
Could  he ,  non-"egocentrically",  reserve  here  for  addressee 's  location 
and  formulate  his  own  from  the  addressee's  point  of view?  Besides the 
lack  of naturalness  of such  a  convention  (it would  run  counter to  the 
way  deictic  'given'ness  vs .  projection work  in the  system  as  a  whole) , 
there  woul d  be  no  deictic available  for  the  reference  to  speaker's 
location  (there,  unlike  here,  requires  'establishing',  see  below) . 
Furthermore,  addressee's  location  may  not  be  involved at  all  (as  in 
+they  offered  me  a  job  i n  Frankfurt,  but  I  prefer staying  here,  said 
by  a  speaker  in  Munich  to an  addressee  in  Hamburg) .  (Where  it is,  as, 
say,  in  (16) ,  both  l ocations  are  necessarily  thematic  and  relevant,  so 
there is not  much  "egocentricity"  left even  here.) 
If here  means  "at t he  ' given '  location  on  the  relevant  dimension  of 
localisation"  as  applied to places  ("spatial"  deixis  is  more  about 
'places '  or  'spaces'  defined  via  social  and  interactional  relevances 
than  about  "space") ,  now  may  be  said to  mean  t he  same  as  applied  to 
time  or,  better again,  'times' .  Just as  'places'  are  defined  by  social 
and/or  ad-hoc  rel evances,  not  'physically'  (and  that is true  even  for 
definitions in  'physical'  terms) ,  'times'  are  delimited  on  the  basis 
of relevant  events,  relevant  change;  the  characterisation  of  the 
meaning  of now  just  given  is  t herefore  equivalent  to  that  given 
earlier:  "since  and  up  to the  last/next  relevant  change"  (where  since 
effects the  same  anchoring  as  'given '  here) .  Depending  on  ad-hoc 
rel evances,  we  use  many  different  dimensions  of  localisation  for 
referring to what  looks  like one  and  the  same  physical  location;  and 
different,  thematically-defined  "time-lines",  each  w ith  its  specific 
delimitations ,  determine the  extension  of any  "present"  or  "now".7 
The  question  of speaker's  vs .  both  interactants'  "now"  on  the  whole 
receives  answers  parall el  to those for  "here",  but  t here  are  some 
clear differences.  One  is  t hat  for  face-to-face  interaction,  it 
practically  never  makes  sense to  distinguish  between  speaker's  and 
addressee's ,  or  coding  and  receiving,  time.  It is only the traditional 
genres  of written  comm unication that  separate  them ,  factually  and , 
under appropriate  conditions,  t hematically. 
For  t he  extreme referential  adaptability  of  here  and  now ,  the 
metaphor  of extensibility has  frequently  been  used ;  it suggests itself 
especial ly  by  contrast to the received  idea  of  what  those  deictics 
designate.  It  is  misleading,  however ,  insofar  as  it  invites 
visualisations  like  that  of  aseries  of  "heres"  expanding 
concentrically around  one  location,  and  of  an  analogous  expansion 
around  the  "present  point"  on  t he  "time  line".  "Here"  just like  "now" 15 
may  localise things  or  events  in  quite  incommensurable  dimensions,  as 
the  examples  have  shown .  This  adaptability  should  not  be  astonishing 
if it were  sufficiently  appreciated  that  here  and  now  are  "pro" 
elements;  "pro"  not  so  much  in  the  sense  of anaphoric  or  syntagmatic 
as  in that of paradigmatic substitutability.8  N o  one  expects to  find 
more  than  a  minimum  of  designative  content,  rather  schematic  in 
nature,  in  a  pro-element,  the  actual  denotata  having  to  be  inferred 
from  context  and  varying  widely.  (Cf.  also section 4.) 
To  a  greater or lesser degree,  the possibilities of reference  will 
usually  be  narrowed  down  by  the  verbal  environment ,  but,  as  a  rule,  no 
more  than that,  and  inferential work  will still be  required.  Speakers 
may  add  explicative material:  cf.  "while  he ...  " in  example  (12) ,  and 
the  following  two  examples: 
(20)  Now  that conflict  has  largely  died  down  i n  Vietnam ,  Laos, 
Cambodia  and  Burma,  tourists are  slowly  returning to what  is  one  of 
the last undeveloped  parts of the world.  (The  Times  Saturday  Review , 
14/3/92) 
(21)  (From  a  broadcast  interview)  Es  ist ja einfach  nicht  so,  daß 
nur  die russischen  AKWs  riskant sind  und  mit  denen  hier in  Deutschland 
überhaupt  nichts  passieren  kann .  (It's  just simpl y  not  the  case  that 
it is only  t he  Russian  nuclear  plants that are  dangerous  while  nothing 
can  happen  with  those  here  in  Germany .) 
One  point  implicit  in  the  preceding  analyses  deserves  special 
mention:  in situated  use,  as  we  have  seen,  the  pragmatic  terms  of 
contrast for  here  and  now  are  not  there  and  then,  as  analyses 
neglecting  discourse  conditions would  make it appear.  Most  discussions 
of the  semantic  domains  of here  and  t here,  e.g.,  seem  tobe based  on  a 
visualisation  of some  spatial extension  starting from  speaker's  or 
speakers'  - physical location,  somehow  divided  up  into  two  zones 
delimiting  each  other,  the  "here"  zone  and  t he  "there"  zone  (with  some 
modifications  for  languages  with  three-or-more-term  distinctions) ; 
illustrative examples  often establish  a  "here"/ "there"  contrast.  But 
the  difference  between  here,  now  and  there,  ' then  is  not  one  of 
remoteness  within  a  single spatial or temporal  plane;  what  is involved 
is different types  of instruction  for  contextualisation,  there/then 
referring  to  places/times  just  'established'  in  the  situation, 
verbally  or  otherwise,  e.g.  by  pointing.9 
It may  seem  amazing  that descriptions  of languages  worldwide  more 
or less  confirm  the time-and-place-of-utterance type  of  analysis  for 
"here"  and  "now".  At  least part of the  answer  certainly  lies  i n  the 
practice of approaching  deixis  without  consideration  of  discourse contexts  (inter  alia,  doubtless,  because 
coordinates"  are feIt to  be  the  relevant 
analyst will  probe  for the  words  by  which  to 
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the  "speech  situation 
context  themselves) .  The 
denote  utterance  place 
and  utterance  time,  and  in  a  typical eliciting situation,  that is what 
"here"  and  "now"  words  will refer to  by  default.  (But  see  now  Hanks 
1990  for  a  realistic approach.) 
A word  concerning the  notion  of thematic  context(s) :  The  crucial 
role  of  the  shared-knowledge  contexts  (or  "frames",  "scenes", 
"background"  etc.)  activated  in  communication  is being  emphasized  more 
and  more  (cf.  SperberjWilson's  -1986  - "context  for  comprehension", 
Fillmore's  -1977,  1985  "scenes"  or  "frames";  Talmy 's  -1988-
"cognitive representation") .  Every  utterance  - in fact,  every  single 
meani ngful  element  of an  utterance  - has  its  indispensable  unspoken 
complement  in the  shared  context it addresses.  In  part,  those  contexts 
will  be  stereotypical and  shared  by  a  larger community  (social  norms; 
the  "scenes"  associated with  lexical elements,  etc.) ,  in  part  they 
will be  specific to those  interacting  on  the  given  occasion,  in  part 
to that occasion itself (e .g. ,  knowledge  concerning  the  course  of  the 
interaction  so  far) .  Access  to t he  relevant shared-knowledge  contexts 
is via  inference  of the  concern  (or  'issue ' )  addressed  by  an  utterance 
(or  meaningful  element  t hereof) ,  a  point  also  emphasized  in 
KeenanjSchieffel in  1976  (cf.  their  "question  of  immediate  concern") 
and  Murray  1983 .  O ne  of t he  hearer's  fundamental tasks,  then,  consists 
i n  inferring t he  concern(s)  addressed  by  an  utterance,  with  the 
associated  shared  'world  segment(s) ' .10 17 
3.  The  1st and  2nd  person  pronouns.  Dne  might  grant  all  the 
preceding  yet  say:  there  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  "I "  and  "you" 
refer to concrete  data  of the  speech  situation at the  very  moment  of 
utterance,  the  distribution of  speech  roles  there  and  then.  What 
parallel  could  there  be  here  to  the  dependence  on  further 
shared-knowledge  contexts for the  determination  of  reference,  or  to 
the  "extensibility"  observed  above  ~  propos  "here"  and  "now"? 
But  the relation  between  1st  and  2nd  person  sg .  pronouns  and 
observable  speech-role distribution  is much  less straightforward  even 
at the  purely referential level than  one  is  inclined  to  think.  The 
actual  speaker  may  be  quoting  the  words  of another  and  using  his  ! ' 
me,  your  etc.  unchanged  (without  even  so  much  of a  warning  as  he/she 
said ...  );  inference is in  order,  again.l  Besides,  in  some  languages 
at least,  "I"  is very  frequent  in  a  generalising  use,  cf.  (22)  and 
(23),  as  is,  of course,  "you";  this adds  to  the  need  for  inference 
(cf.  the oscillation,  in  (22) ,  between  the  'generalized'  use  - here  in 
boldface  - and  actual self-reference  i n  1  shall  be  arguing) .2 
(22)  (About  Silent Speech  Acts)  Dur  subject  matter  here  is  those 
expressions . ..  which  appear  in  cognitive  space...  Whilst 
expressions  in actual space  may  be  witnessed  by  anyone  who 
happens  to  be  around,  I  am  the  only  witness to what  I  put  into 
my  own  cognitive  space.  With  respect to <silent  speech  acts>,  1 
shall be  arguing,  I  play  both  quasi-speaker  and  quasi-hearer. 
(Murray  1987 :383) 
(23)  D'une  maniere  generale,  quand  j'emploie  le  present  d'un  verbe 
aux  trois personnes  (selon  la  nomenclature  traditionnelle),  il 
semble  que  la difference  de  personne  n'amene  aucun  changement  de 
sens  dans  la  forme  verbale  conjuguee.  (Benveniste  1958:263) 
Conversely,  speaker  and  addressee  reference is not  always  accomplished 
through  specialised  forms .  English  you  does  not tell me  if 1  alone  or 
1  plus  any  number  of others,  who  need  not  even  be  present,  are  being 
addressed;  analogous  problems  arise in  formal  address,  in the  numerous 
languages that  use  for this purpose  pronouns  that otherwise  have  2nd 
person  plural or  3rd  person  singular or plural' reference.  Mitigating 
we  may  be  used  where  actually the addressee is being referred to  (not 
only  in  addressing  children) ;  in  German ,  many  people  are  in the  habit 
of using  generic  man  ("one")  when  they  are  actually  referring  to 
themselves;  an  author  may  use  we  to refer to  hirnself,  along  with  1  and 
with  we's that refer to the  scientific community ,  and  so  on . 
3  -
Caricaturing  a  little,  the frequent  statement that,  to  know  who  1 
and  you  refer to,  we  must  know  "who  is uttering the  sentence",  and  who 
is being  spoken  to,  might  lead to the  idea  that  a  person  that  knew 18 
only  the words  for  ur u  and  uyouu  in  some  language  could tell how  many 
times  over  a  given  exchange  a  speaker  had  referred to  himself and  how 
many  times to  his  addressee.  This is far  from  what  actually  happens. 
On  the other hand,  what  interferes with  such  simple  correspondences is 
well-defined  patterns of usage,  so  that if  we  state  and  'subtract' 
those,  it  is  indeed  possible  to  correlate  1st  person  and 
self-reference  on  the  one  hand  and  2nd  person  and  addressee-reference 
on  the other. 
With  the  plural pronouns  of 1st and  2nd  person,  however  (it  has 
often  been  stated that they  are  not really in  a  uplural"  relation  to 
their singular  analogs),  we  are  back  to  the  kind  of  situation 
encountered  with  here  and  now:  the 1st and  2nd  person  element  can  be 
characterised  as  above,  but  the  "plural"  element  far  from 
pluralising  uspeakeru  or  uaddresseeu - actually  adds  something  like 
"and  a  relevant  otherjand  relevant  others",  or,  more  adequately, 
constitutes a  contextually relevant  group  of  persons  that  includes 
speaker or  hearer or  both;  what  that group  is  (and  also,  for  languages 
that do  not  overtly  distinguish  "inclusive"  from  "exclusive"  1st 
person  pI.  reference,  whether the  addressee  belongs  to  it),  must, 
again,  be  inferred  on  the  basis  of the thematic  context. 
For  1st person  plural,  the  'relevant  group '  may  comprise,  besides 
the  speaker,  any  number  of persons  up  to the rest of  mankind,  and  a 
2nd  person  plural  pronoun  has  almost  the  same  variability  of 
inclusion.  So  here  indeed  we  do  have  a  parallel to the  'extensibility' 
(not  a  good  term,  as  we  noted  p.14)  observed  with  here  and  now 
(logically enough,  it is  lacking  with  the  designations  of  single 
individuals, land you) .  Hanks  (who  more  aptly  speaks  of  scope,  not 
extensibility)  also  observes this parallel;  moreover,  the 
quotation  furnishes  a  correspondence,  for this  domain,  to 
stated  above  (p.14)  concerning  the  multitude  of  socially 
following 
wh at  was 
constituted 
'spaces'  and  event-dependent  'time-lines'  available  for  defining  a 
given  "here"  or  "now": 
"The  variation  in  the  scope  of  the  'we'  is  an  unavoidable 
consequence  of  any  individual's  belonging  to  many  distinct 
aggregates  at a  single time.  From  the  viewpoint  of deixis,  it  is 
the  same  variability in  scope  that  we  see  in  different  uses  of 
'here'  and  'there' .  (Hanks  1990:172) 
(24)  (From  a  phone-in  broadcast discussion  about  seasonal  rhythms  in 
modern  times)  Wir  sind  gar  nicht  mehr  so  abhängig  von  den 
Jahreszeiten  vom  Wechsel  der  Jahreszeiten mit  unserer  Ernährung, 
nicht?  Alles  immer .  (We  are  no  longer  so  dependent  on  the 
seasons  on  the  change  of seasons  for  our  food,  are  we?  Everything 
a11  the time.) (25)  (A  little later)  So,  wir haben  jetzt die  erste  Hörerin  am 
Telefon.  (O .k.,  we  now  have  the first listener on  t he  line.) 
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(26)  I  believe that for  each  three-step  demonstrative  system  that  we 
examine  we  need  to  ask  what  choice the  language  has  made  with its 
middle  term .. .  (Fillmore  1982:50) 
(27)  (Making  an  appointment  for the  evening.  The  speaker  is  married, 
the  addressee  single)  Wir  wollten  vielleicht  in  diesen 
mexikanischen  Film  gehen.  Wenn  du  kommst ,  könnten  wir  doch 
zusammen...  (We  were  thinking  of maybe  going  to  that  Mexican 
film.  If you  come  <to  see  us>,  we  might  <go>  together ...  ) 
Parallel to what  we  have  seen  for  here  and  now ,  the  inclusion  of 
the  group  need  not  always  be  delimitable with  numerical  precision;  it 
is often sufficient that the thematically relevant  group  as  such  be 
recognised.  The  distinction  between  'inclusive'  and  'exclusive' 
interpretation of we  in  languages that  do  not  have  separate  forms  is 
dependent  on  the thematic  context,  just like that  between  "where  we 
are"  and  "where  I  am"  as  appropriate  interpretations  of here  (and  the 
verbal  environment  may  help,  cf.  the  "together"  in  (27))-:r-
Let  us  return to the  singular  pronouns  and  leave  aside  questions  of 
reference  assignment,  to  discuss  how  their meanings  should  be  defined. 
For  the  moment ,  I  shall mainly  concentrate  on  first person.  According 
to the  prevailing  opinion,  something  like  "the speaker  of the  present 
utterance"  is an  adequate  rendering  of the  meaning  of I .  But  parallel 
to what  we  have  seen  for  here  and  now ,  a  first  person  pronoun  (I  or, 
for that matter,  me ,  my ...  )  is not  used  in  order  to  refer  to  the 
speaker in that capacity,  as  the  momentary  incumbent  of  speaker's 
role;  what  it is used  to refer to  is  the  individual  known  to  the 
interlocutor that  he  iso To  interpret an  utterance with  a  1st  person 
sg.  element,  it is not  enough,  and  is at one  stage  beside  the  point, 
to fill in  "the  speaker  of  this  sentence"  in  the  'blank'.  Such 
utterances  are  interpreted  by  recourse  to  the  presupposed  relevant 
knowledge  concerning  the  individual in  question  (and  any  information 
they  may  convey  about  him/her is intended  to  have  repercussions  on 
that  very  knowledge) . 
(28)  +  I  just got  an  invitation from  t he  Millers. 
(29)  +  All  of a  sudden  there 's  this  big  fat  Mercedes  trying  to 
overtake  m e ... 
(30)  +  Let's meet  at  my  place. 
(31)  +  Five  years  ago,  I  was  living  in  Mexico. 20 
(32)  +  (A  person  invited to  a  party  calling the  host:)  It's  a  great 
pity really,  but  I  have  such  a  bad  'flu I  just can't come. 
(28)  will,  in situated  use,  be  adequately  interpreted  only  if  the 
listener  activates  his/her  presupposed  knowledge  of  what  the 
relations  hip  between  speaker  and  the  Millers iso Perhaps  they  were  on 
bad  terms  up  to  now;  invitations to  the  Millers'  may  be  something 
craved  or  something  abhorred  by  the  speaker;  what  is his/her  reaction 
going  to  be;  etc.  etc.  For  (29),  knowledge  of the  type  of  car  the 
speaker drives  may  be  essential to grasping the  point  of the  upcoming 
narrative episode:  a  race  between  two  fast  cars,  for  example,  if  he 
drives  a  Porsche,  or the  insolence  of drivers  of big  cars,  if his is a 
Rabbit.  (30)  will  hardly  make  a  good  appointment if all the  addressee 
is supposed  to rely  on  is his  knowledge  of the speaker's  "participant 
role"  at the  moment;  and  in  what  sense  could  the !  of  (31)  be  said  to 
relate to the  speaker's role as  speaker?  Is the  addressee  of  (32)  to 
tellother guests  "the  man  who  told  me  he  has  such  a  bad  'flu  he  can't 
come  has  such  a  bad  'flu  he  can't come"?  Of  course,  he  would  use  the 
person's  name,  or  some  description  likewise  based  on  shared  knowledge 
of the  individual. 
When  the  pronoun  is stressed,  it is often  particularly clear how  it 
aims  at the  speaker in his  known  identity,  not  qua  speaker: 
(33)  Rel: 
Stanley: 
Rel: 
Shut  up  please! 
... 'ey,  you  tellin'  me? 
Yes.  Your  mother's  a  duck.  (Labov  1972:304) 
Stanley is,  of course,  not  drawing  attention to  himself as  utterer  of 
the  utterance.  What  the  stressed  me  is intended to  bring  to  the  fore 
is obviously  those  aspects  of his identity that should  keep  Rel  from 
daring to address  a  command  to  him  (the  fact that he  is  a  leader  in 
the  peer  group,  the  exploits  or  other  personal  attributes  that  have 
made  him  such,  etc.) .  Rel ' s  artful  dodge  a  'ritual  insult' 
equivalent  here to  "I  am  joking"  (Labov  1972:305,351f)  - shows  this is 
the  way  he  actually  understood  the  question. 
What  parts of the  shared  knowledge  about  the  speaker  are  to  be 
activated  for the interpretation in  any  given  case  is,  of  course, 
dependent  on  the  context. 
It seems  clear,  then,  that a  statement like  "I  means  the  addresser 
(and  you,  the  addressee)  of the  message  to which  it belongs"  (Jakobson 
1957/1971:132)  can  only  be  read  as  a  description  of  how  the  reference 
of those  pronouns  is determined,  the  verb  mean  being  used  in  a  loose 
sense.  Placing  the  quotation  marks  differently,  "I  means  'the 
addresser  of  the  message  to  which  I  belongs''',  as  a  meaning 21 
definition,  cannot,  as  we  have  seen,  be  adequate,  if  a  meaning 
definition is to  capture  an  element' s  systematic  contribution  to  the 
interpretation of utterances.  A realistic definition  will  at  least 
have  to  state  that  the  pronoun  serves  to  indicate  the  'known 
individual'  that is the addresser of the  statement.  (And  perhaps  even 
that is formulated  too  much  from  an  extraneous  perspective.  I  am  "I" 
whether talking  or listening.  Why  not  simply  say that the  meanings  of 
the first and  second  person  pronouns  are  built on  the  convention  that 
everybody  refers to  himself as  "I"  and  addresses  others  as  "you"?)  We 
come  back  to the  question  of definition in the  next  section. 
It has  been  said,  rightly,  that the speakerjhearer dichotomy  is  an 
oversimplification  (Hymes  1972,  Goffman  1979,  cf.  Levinson  1988) .  The 
person  talking  may  in fact  be  rendering  the words  of someone  else,  so 
we  should  distinguish  between  the  "phonator"  or  "animator"  and  the 
"principal"  or  "source";  the  person  ostensibly  spoken  to  may  not 
coincide  with  the  intended  recipient,  being  perhaps  merely  a 
messenger,  etc.  Such  distinctions are  important  to  the  analysis  of 
many  types  of speech  event.  The  interpretation  of  the  1st  and  2nd 
person  pronouns,  however,  is  uniformly  'source'  (in  the  sense  of 
'accountable  speaker' )  and  'intended recipient',  respectively.  When  I 
talk to a  'messenger',  e.g.,  I  may  use  you  in regard to  him  as  weIl  as 
to the third  party  ("I  want  yau  to  tell  him:  yau  are  to  come  by 
Friday") ;  but  since the  utterances  where  I  use  you  to  address  the 
'messenger'  will  be  for  him,  at  that  point  he  is  the  intended 
recipient,  just as  the third  party  i s  in  utterances that. are for  him . 
When  we  hear  someone  reading  a  paper  for  someone  el se  at  a  congress 
say  "throughout this paper  1  am  assuming ... ",  we  will interpret the  I 
as  referring to the  "principal",  i .e.,  the  author  of  the  paper,  the 
"source"  of the  utterance  i n  question;  but  when  he  says  "I  am  afraid 1 
have  mislaid  a  page",  we  will interpret such  an  !  as  referring  to  the 
"source"  of that utterance,  in this case  the  ."phonator",  at  speech 
event level.  Jakobson 's  formulation  (cf.  above)  is in this sense  quite 
precise.- I  have  for this reason  not  feIt  uneasy  about  using  the 
traditional terms  "speaker" ,  "addressee"  and  the like;  t hey  are,  for 
our  purposes,  never to  be  understood  in the sense  of  "mere  phonator", 
"mere messenger"  and  the like.5 
A final  note:  For  many  kinds  of  speech  event,  saying  that  "I" 
involves the  speaker's  known  individuality  may  appear  too  strong  a 
formulation.  When  the priest says  "I  baptise  thee ...  ",  it  is  not 
really  him  as  an  individual that the  pronoun  involves.  Yet  far  more 
than  his  speaking  the  words  in  question  plays apart;  he  is  known  or 22 
at least assumed  to speak  them  rightfully,  i .e.  to  really  hold  the 
function  of priest.  Knowledge  of the speaker  'as  aperson '  is  often 
restricted to such  functional  or  schematic  elements;  a  term  like 
'figure '  might  be  more  appropriate in  such  cases than  'individual'.  Be 
that as it may ,  interpretation of the  pronoun  depends  on  what  the 
hearer  knows  or infers about the speaker  beyond  the fact  of his  being 
speaker  ("speaker"  is  being  used  for  spoken  as  weIl  as  written 
communication,  of course) .  Areader of  one  of King  Asoka 's  Rock  Edicts 
in  some  outer  province  of India ,  in  the  3rd  century  BC,  probably  did 
not  know  the  speaker  as  an  individual,  in the  everyday  sense;  but  he 
had  to  know  'who  he  was ' ,  to  be  able to make  sense  of the  inscription 
- even  if this  knowl edge  was  inferred  from  the  inscription  itself. 
Even  in reading  an  anonymous  lyrical poem,  we  endow  the  'speaker'  (the 
literary construct,  not  the  author)  with  a  number  of  conventional  or 
inferred attributes as  a  background  against which  to interpret what  he 
says.  I  have  come  to doubt that there  are  in fact  any  kinds  of  speech 
act or  speech  event where  we  might  safely  say that what  counts  for the 
interpretation of an  I  is nothing  but the role of speaker.  One  is  led 
to think  of ritual genres,  but  even  there  a  'speaker'  will  have  some 
transcendent legitimation  from  which  the  speaking  role  derives  and 
which  is  presupposed  for  the  interpretation  of  any  occurring 
self-references.  Performative  formulas  - I  baptize  you,  I  swear,  I 
promise  - are  not  cases  in  point either:  the  I  of I  baptize  you  has  to 
be  an  authorized  representative  of  the  institution;  "commissives" 
engage  the  speaker  not  qua  speaker  but  qua  'social figure '  or  ' known 
individual',  and  the  contribution of the-Ist sg.  pronoun  in them  lies 
in  identifying  t he  accountable  individual:  it  is  Peter  Smith,  not 
Donald  Butler  - if Peter Smith  swore  or  promised  - who  will  be  held 
responsible  should  the testimony  prove  false  or the  promise  be  broken. 23 
4.  Defining  the  meanings  of the  deictics  so  far.  We  have  seen that 
I  refers  to  the  'source'  (or  'accountable  formulator ' )  of  the 
utterance  in  which  it figures.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  examples  have 
shown,  its  actual  contribution  to  the  intended  messages  is  not 
concerned  in  any  way  with  the individual's  engagement  in the  utterance 
event.  If the  definition of a  meaning  is to  capture  the  conceptual 
elements it may  contribute to  the  content  of  an  utterance,  then, 
clearly,  gearing  the  definition to the  individual's  role  as  source  of 
the  message  is out  of place,  and  a  concept like  that  of  a  (perhaps 
schematically)  'known  individual'  indispensable;  on  the  other  hand , 
that individual's  identification is based  on  this very  role,  and  we 
would  be  leaving  out  precisely  what  makes  the  meaning  a  deictic  one  if 
we  did  not  account  for this relation. 
What  we  must  do  is  keep  the two  levels  that  of  the  conceptual 
contribution and  that of referent identification - apart.  We  can  t hen 
more  adequately  describe the characteristic  semiotic  design  of  the 
pro-elements  we  have  seen  so  far. 
Let  us,  following  Weinreich  (1963/1966), 
(which  figure  among  his  "formators" ,  signs 
distinguish  deictics 
that  "consist  of  a 
sign-vehicle and  an  implicit i nstruction for  an  operation",  1966:145) 
from  "designators"  such  as  lexical  elements  (which  "consist  of  a 
sign-vehicle  and  a  designatum",  ibid.) .  M ore  precisely,  we  must 
distinguish  deictic  from  designative  components  of  signs,  since 
deictics also  have  at  least  some  designative  meaning ,  and  many 
designative signs  (come ,  bring,  contemporary ...  ,  and  see  section  6) 
have  a  deictic  component.1 
With  deictics,  particularly the  pro-elements  we  are  now  treating, 
the relation  between  the signifiant and  the  conceptual  elements  the 
sign  contributes to the  message  is different from  that obtaining  with 
'designators'.  A signifiant like the  ubiquitous table,  or  better,  cup 
(to  evoke  the  rich  conceptual analysis  of  tha~  word  in  Wierzbicka 
1985)  is associated  in the  language  with  a  set  of  'stereotypical' 
attributes  on  which  the listener draws  in reconstructing the  intended 
message  (a  process  I  imagine  takes  place  along  the  lines  shown  by 
Fillmore's analyses,  especially  1977) .  What  is  associated  with  the 
signifiant I  is a  search  instruction in speech-situational terms:  the 
hearer is first to  find  the  intended referent  and  then  to  draw  upon 
that referent' s  individual shared-knowledge  attributes to  reconstruct 
the  intended  message  ("first"  and  "then"  reflect  a  logical,  not  a 
temporal  order).  You ,  here,  now  etc.  operate the  same  way . 24 
Lexemes  and  pro-elements alike are  used  to  evoke  elements  of  the 
thematic  world  segments  rather than  of the  speech  exchange  scenario. 
But  with the  pro-elements,  we  reach  those  elements  via adetour,  the 
association is largely  ad-hoc,  and  it is mainly  the  search  instruction 
that is firmly  associated with  the  sign. 
The  search  instruction teIls the  hearer  to  fill  the  'blank'  by 
reference to situationally identified individuals,  places,  times:  the 
source  of the  present  utterance,  its intended recipient,  the  'given' 
position  on  the thematically relevant  dimension  of  places  or  times. 
(All the  meanings  in  question  are  inherently  definite. )  It,  too, 
implies  an  amount  of constant  designative  meaning :  "individual"  in the 
case  of  "I"  and  "you";  "at  place ...  "  and  "at time . . . " ,  with  "here"  and 
"now" . 
There  should  be  nothing  very  unexpected  about  such  a 
characterisation of pro-elements.  But  - parallel to what  we  said  above 
(p.13)  for  here  and  now  - the  pronominal  character of land you  is  in 
general  not  fully  considered  and  those  elements  said to  stand  for  the 
speech  event  participants  as  such;  from  mere  clues  for  the 
determination  of reference,  "speaker"  and  like concepts  are  promoted 
to  designata. 
The  semantic  definition,  then,  will  have  to  characterise  the 
semiotic  design  of the  elements,  the  way  the  conceptual  contribution 
to the  intended  message  is obtained  via  the  shared  knowledge  about the 
individual referent found  via  the  search  instruction  in  the  sign, 
rather than  via  the  shared stereotypical  knowledge  associated  with  a 
typical designative  sign. 
This  semiotic  design,  incidentally,  is in  part  like  that  of  proper 
names,  person  as  weIl  as  place.  The  search  instruction  here  lS,  grosso 
modo,  relative to the  individuals  and  places liable to  be  referred  to 
among  the  given  interactants and  in  the  given  thematic  context  (there 
is thus  a  clear deictic  element  to  person  and  place  names);  upon 
retrieval of the referent,  the relevant  knowledge  associated  with  it 
can  be  brought to  bear  on  the interpretation of the  message.  I  am  here 
indebted  to  Schegloff  1972,  from  where  I  quote  the  following 
concerning  the  "recognizability"  of person  and  place  names : 
"It appears to  be  the  ca se that persons  (in this society,  at least) 
in  using  names  and  in  asking  for  them,  claim  their 
recognizability ...  To  speak  of the  "recognizability  of  the  name" 
is insufficiently precise  here.  What  is  central  is  more  than 
hearing  once  again  a  sequence  of morphemes  that  have  been  heard 
before.  What  we  mean  by  "recognizability"  is that  the  hearer  can 
perform  operations  on  the  name  -- categorize it,  find  as  a  member 
of which  class it is being  used,  bring  knowledge  to  bear  on  it, 
detect which  of its attributes are  relevant in  context,  etc.  It  is 
the ability to  do  such  operations  on  a  name  that  allows  such 
responses  as: 25 
*  A:  who  did  you  go  with? 
B:  Mary. 
A:  Oh,  it was  a  family  affair. 
Whereas  in  English,  personal  names  may  indicate sex,  ethnicity, 
and  sometimes  social class,  they  are  otherwise  mute .  Recognition 
involves,  then,  the ability to bring  knowledge  to  bear  on  them,  to 
categorize,  see  the  relevant  significance,  to  see  "in  what 
capacity"  the  name  is used.  In this respect,  too,  place  names  are 
like personal  names . 
A:  And  he  said that  some  teacher,  who's  coming  uhm  from  I 
believe  he  might  have  said Brooklyn,  some  place  in the  east. 
Here  the  particular  place  that  had  been  mentioned  lS  not 
clearly  remembered,  but  the  outcome  of  some  operation  (some 
analysis  of the  place that was  mentioned)  is."  (Schegloff 1972.) 26 
5.  The  "spatio-temporal zero-point" .  The  meanings  of here  and  now 
and  the reference  points  of  'spatial'  and  temporal  deictics  with  a 
fuller designative  component  are  usually  equated  ,  under  the  idea that 
it is utterance  place  and  time that are  at stake  in all cases  (cf.  the 
frequent  use  of the  locution  "the  here-and-now"  to  designate  the 
deictic center  - as  in the  quotation  from  Lyons  below  p.  29).  Now,  it 
is clear that if,  e.g.,  here  may  designate,  a  la  limite,  the  whole 
terrestrial world,  the  "here-and-now"  reference  point of, 
downstairs  cannot  possibly  be  as  extended. 
let's  say, 
For  the  pro-adverbials,  the  kind  and  extension 
referents  depends  entirely on  the  thematic  context. 
of  the  ad-hoc 
With  the  more 
designative  spatial  and  temporal  deictics,  perviousness  to  the 
thematic  context  is  restricted  by  the  designative  component,  to 
varying  degrees  corresponding to the  degree  of semantic  vagueness  of 
that component  (vagueness  or,- more  positively,  context  adaptabi-
lity).  Let  us  look  at a  few  sampie  expressions:  downstairs,  next  door, 
abroad,  over(by  the  window) ;  half aminute  ago,  last night,  recently, 
500  years  ago,  in  t he  past.  Half  aminute  aga  determines  the 
'location'  of the  event  in  question  much  more  precisely  than  last 
night;  recently  may  refer to  days  or weeks  or  years  ago,  depending  on 
the  context;  500  years  aga  may  refer to  a  given  year,  as  in  (34),  or 
to  a  more  extended  epoch,  as  in  (35) : 
(34)  +Just  500  years  ago  Columbus  discovered  America . 
(35)  +This  country  was  much  more  wooded  500  years  ago . 
Downstairs  and  next  door  circumscribe  the 
narrowly  than  abroad  (still,  you  may  have 
handbag  than  the  kitchen  of  my  house  if 
downstairs,  and  next  door  may  be  in  the 
neighbours ' ) .  And  so  on . 
intended  location 
more  trouble  finding 
I  say  of  either  it 





With  the  character of  the  designative  component,  the  kind  and 
extension of the spatial and  temporal reference  points  varies;  and  the 
more  pervious this component  in  a  sign  to  the  influence  of  the 
thematic  context,  the  more  pervious  the reference  point.  Over  by  the 
window  determines  the reference  point relatively more  precisely  ("in 
the  same  room,  but  some  distance  away  from  the window")  than  next  door 
("to the  room  where  we  are",  "to the  house  where  we  are")  or  abroad 
(the  interactants may  be  in  New  York,  yet  speak  of  friends  in  San 
Francisco  going  abroad);  aminute  ago  determines  the  reference  point 
more  precisely,  in  a  literally chronometrie  sense,  than  five  hundred 27 
years  ago,  which,  depending  on  the reference  context,  may  be  relative 
to  "this year"  (just 500  years  aga  Columbus  discovered  America,  said 
anywhere  between  Jan.  1st and  Dec.  31st of 1992),  to  "our  century" , 
"modern  times" ,  etc.:  generally,  to  the  time  since  the  relevant 
changes  intervened  (cf.  eX .35)1.  Even  more  latitude  is  left  by  an 
expression  like  in  the  past  (or,  for  that  matter,  by  tense 
morphology),  as  regards localisation as  weIl  as  reference  point. 
Parallel to what  we  have  seen  for  here  and  now,  what  spatial  and 
temporal  deictics are  systematically relative to is  not  the  literal 
place  and  time  where  and  when  the  utterance is made,  but  the  'given' 
position  within  the  dimension  of  localisation  activated  by  the 
designative  component  of the  sign  and/or the thematic  context.  At  this 
level  of  abstraction,  and  in  a  relational,  not  a  concretely 
referential sense,  we  may  indeed  equate  "here"  and  "now"  with  the 
zero-points  presupposed  by  the  'designative'  spatial  and  temporal 
deictics.  Functionally,  we  observe  a  complementarity:  here,  e.g., 
designates the  'given'  position  as  against  implied  "not-here"  ones;  a 
non-"pro"  spatial deictic designates  a  "not-here"  position  as  against 
an  implied  'given'  one . 
A possible  objection to the  characterisation of  the  ' zero-points' 
that I  give  here  (j  ust  as  to that of  "here"  and  "now")  is that,  after 
all,  to remain  in the spatial dimension,  the  kinds  of place  that  are 
here  considered reference  points  include  the  place where  the  speaker 
is,  so  that it all comes  back  to that,  in  the  end .  In  fact,  many 
authors  have  defined  "here"/"now"  or the  corresponding  zero-points  as 
places/times that do  not  so  much  coincide with  as  "include"  speaker's 
position/time  of  utterance. 
But  this is  geometry .  In  communication,  the  implied  reference 
points playa role  beyond  that of furnishing  the  points  ' from  where' 
to  compute  the  ad-hoc  va lues  of the  designative deictics;  the relation 
between  these  values  and  the  reference  points  themselves  may  be 
relevant to the  intended  message.  If I  say,  in  Munich , 
(36)  +  I  wish  I  could  live  abroad, 
I  may  get,  and  may  have  been  wishing  to  provoke,  an  answer  like: 
"don't you  like Germany?";  it is the  country  where  we  are/where  I  am 
that counts  as the  reference  point of abroad.  Ex.  (37) 
(37)  +  Who  are the  owners  of the  yellow  house  next door? 
brings  into play  two  houses,  or  perhaps  household  units,  not the  house 
next  door  plus,  e.g.,  the  place  in front  of the  fireplace  where  the 28 
interlocutors are sitting.  In  (38),  the relevant contrast is between  a 
destination  within  or  close to Göttingen  and  a  long-distance  one;  the 
zero-point  relative  to  which  the  destination  is  "far  away"  is 
Göttingen,  not  the particular spot  on  the way  to  my  home  where  we  are 
when  the driver is talking to  me: 
(38)  (A  taxi-driver:)  Das  beste ist immer,  wenn  ein  Fahrgast  an  einen 
entfernten  Ort will.  'Ne  entspannte  Autobahnfahrt ...  (What  I 
like best is when  a  passenger wants  to  go  to  a  far-away  place.  A 
relaxed ride  on  the  Autobahn . . . ) 
(39)  and  (40)  clearly  depend  in  their  pragmatic  value  on  the 
presupposed  reference  point: 
(39)  Equally  novel is the  idea  of flying  to Paris with  Bahrain-based 
Gulf Air,  or  to  Frankfurt  on  TWA  or  Philippine  Airlines. 
("Europe's  secret  airlines" ,  The  Times  Saturday  Review, 
23/6/1990) 
(40)  ...  a  return to  Frankfurt  can  cost  about  ~  70,  compared  with ... 
(ibid.) 
For  someone  in  Dubai  who  wants  to  go  to Paris,  or  a  person  in  Albany 
N.Y.  or in  Manila  planning to  go  to  Germany,  there will be  nothing  so 
novel  about the ideas  presented,  and  wh ether .~  70  is  an  interesting 
rate for areturn  flight  to  Frankfurt  depends  on  the  point  of 
departure.  In the  examples,  the  relevant  zero-point  is  obviously 
London,  but  not  some  particular  "utterance  place"  or  "speaker's 
location"  there;  the delimitation is  determined  by  the  "not  here" 
designated  by  the  deictic  expression  (and  other  elements  of  the 
thematic  'air travel'  context:  your  ticket will  not take  you  from  and 
back  to  any  place within  London). 
When  a  textile firm  puts  a  little label  "Imported"  into  a  shirt 
(with  addressee-oriented  'projection'  of the  reference  point),  that 
information is relative to the  country  where  the shirt is put  on  sale, 
not to the  place  in  that  country  where  I  read  the  label.  The 
information is meant  to  be  valid  in  every  place within  this  country, 
and  would,  if some  of the shirts were  sold  in the  country  of  origin, 
be  non-valid there;  anywhere  in this latter country  I  could,  if I  had 
an  interest in  doing  so,  file a  complaint. 
Note  that the  determination  of the reference  points  (and  of  the 
reference of here  and  now)  via  the relevant dimension  of  contrast  as 
activated  by  the thematic  context  and  the  designative  component  yields 
quite  precise  (though  complex  and  basically abstract)  entities,  while, 
e.g.  "place  including  speaker's location"  does  not  help  a  hearer  much 
in  a  given  case if he  knows  that  that  place  can  be  of  indefinite 29 
extension  but  does  not  know  what  the  extension  meant  right  now  iso 
Besides,  the  characterisation distorts relevance relations in the many 
ca ses  where  the  speaker's  physical location is of  no  import  to  the 
locating  expression  being  used.  (Also,  as  we  saw  above,  p.  11,  with 
examples  (15a)  and  (15b),  speaker  or interactants  need  not  be  located 
physically within the  space  referred to as  here  on  a  given  occasion.) 
We  begin to see the  lack  of realism of the  current  conception  of 
the function  of deixis  as  expressed  in  statements like the  following: 
" ...  the  basic function  of deixis is  to  relate 
situations  to  which  reference  is  made  in 
spatio-temporal zero-point  (the  here-and-now) 
utterance."  (Lyons  1982:121) 
or,  with regard to spatial deixis  in  particular, 
the  entities 
language  to 




"Spatial deixis is that aspect  of deixis which  involves  referring 
to the  locations in  space  of the  communication  act participants; it 
is that part of spatial semantics  which  takes  the  bodies  of  the 
communication  act  participants as  significant reference  objects for 
spatia1 specification."  (Fi11more  1982:37) 
The  vast  domain  of locationa1 deixis,  with its abstract relations,  and 
re1ata  defined  essentiallyon a  social  and  interactional  basis,  is 
conceptualised  on  the  pattern of  an  interesting  but  systematically 
quite  restricted  subdomain,  that  of  quasi-geometrie  locating 
expressions  such  as  in front  of,  right,  left,  under  used  in reference 
to objects in the  immediate  perceptual field;  and  the  equally  complex 
field  of time  deixis reduced  to the  indication of  temporal  relations 
to the  moment  of speech,  the  need  for  which  in situated speech,  again, 
arises  under  quite  limited  circumstances:  with  small-scale  measures 
such  as  seconds,  minutes  (where  not  too  many),  quarters  or  halves  of 
hours  (but  here  already,  things get more  approximative) . 30 
6.  Deictic  "egocentricity"  and  "subjectivity".  Deixis is generally 
said to  be  organised  i n  an  "egocentric"  way .  Immediately  following  the 
characterisation of the  basic  function  of deixis  by  Lyons  that  I  just 
quoted,  we  read: 
" ... this zero-point is egocentric,  as  everyone  who  ever  talks 
about  deixis  would  agree."  (Lyons  1982:121.) 
The  second  clause is overstated,  and  there  have  been  voices  expressly 
questioning  the  adequacy  of the  concept  (Opalka  1982,  Pasierbsky  1982, 
and  see  now  Hanks  1990);  but  the tenet remains  near-general. 
Deixis  has  also  long  been  associated with  "subjectivity",  and  the 
not ion  of an  "irreducible subjectivity"  introduced  by  it into  language 
has  regained  currency  of late.1 
"Egocentricity"  as  weIl  as  "subjectivity"  invite associations  that 
are  in  conflict with  the  idea  of language  as  a  socially  shared  system. 
What  is meant  by  them ,  in  our  context? 
Although  the  distinction  is  not  general,  the  notions  of 
egocentricity  and  subjectivity are  current,  by  and  large,  in regard to 
specific types  of  phenomena  each ,  at  least  in  the  more  re  cent 
literature  (cf.  Lyons  1982,  esp.  121f):  "egocentricity"  is  meant  to 
capture the  putative relativity of all deictic  signs,  in  particular 
spatial  and  temporaIones,  to  the  speaker  as  reference  point; 
"subjectivity"  is  used  predominantly  a)  for  'shifts  of  perspective', 
b)  for  what  seems  to  underlie  grammatical  mood  and  all  kinds  of 
evaluative and  expressive  signs. 
As  to  "egocentricity",  I  hope  the  examples  have  shown  that  the 
assumption  has  no  factual  basis.  In  those  ca ses  where  it  is  actually 
speaker's  'location'  to the  exclusion  of addressee 's  that  serves  as 
reference  point,  there is a  functional  motivation  for it.  I  have  tried 
to  show  this for the  use  of here;  more  arguments  could  be  given  by 
looking  at other deictics  and,  importantly,  by  analysing  the  contexts 
i n  more  detail  and  showing  how  t hey  may  make  either  'projection'  or 
speaker-relative formulation  the  more  natural  choice. 
The  notion  of deictic egocentricity  should  certainly  be  abandoned . 
As  things  are,  it exerts  a  very  strong  influence  on  the  imagination  of 
researchers  and  frequently  biases their thinking.  Thus,  in  one  of  the 
rare  attempts  at  characterising  wh at  "egocentricity"  is  (mostly,  the 
concept  is presented  as  self-evident),  we  read: 
" .. . the  unmarked  anchorage  points,  constituting the  deictic centre, 
are typically  assumed  to  be  as  folIows:  (i)  the  central  person  is 
t he  speaker,  (ii)  the  central time  is the time at which  the  speaker 
produces  the  utterance,  (iii)  the  central  place  is  the  speaker's 31 
location at utterance time  or  C<oding>T<ime> ,  (iv)  t he  discourse 
centre is the  point which  the  speaker  is  currently  at  in  the 
production  of his  utterance,  and  (v)  the  social  centre  is  the 
speaker' s  social status and  rank,  to  wh ich the status  or  rank  of 
addressees  or referents is relative."  (Levinson  1983:63f) 
But  - leaving  aside  (ii)  and  (iii) ,  which  we  have  discussed  - ,  ad  (i) , 
no  justification is given  for  considering  the  speaker  "the  central 
person"  (in  person  deixis);  as to  (iv),  the  current  "discourse  centre" 
is certainly  a  point  both  i nteractants  "are at",  if  i n  complementary 
roles;  calling it "the  point which  t he  addressee is  currently  at  in 
the reception  of the  utterance"  would  seem  no  more  arbitr ary  than  the 
formulation  proposed;  for  (v),  likewise,  considering  the  "status  and 
rank  of addressee's  or referents"  as  central,  and  that of t he  speaker 
relative to it,  seems  no  less warranted  than  the  other  way  around . 
The  common  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  deictic 
"egocentricity"  may  lead to statements that  verge  on  the  fantastic: 
"Egocentric  use  of t he  space  concept  places  ego  at  the  center  of 
the  universe.  From  this  point  of  orlgln  ego  can  layout  a 
three-dimensional  coordinate  system ...  "  (MillerjJohnson-Laird 
1976:395) 
"The  first spatial relatum  we  learn to  use  is  ego.  The  primitive 
meaning  of  "here"  is  "where  I  am",  "fram"  lS  probably  first 
understood  as  "from  me",  "ta"  as  "ta  me",  and  so  on ."  (ibid.  394, 
emphasis  mine .) 
Of  course,  the  concept  invites psychologistic associations .  Against 
those,  it is weIl to  underline,  with  Tanz  1980,  that  mastery  of  the 
deictic  system is actually  founded  on  non-"egocentric"  understanding 
of perspective. 
an 
"Ta  use  the deictic  terms  correctly,  chi ldren  must  incorporate 
perspective  as  a  component  of meaning.  They  are  addressed  by  name 
and  as  you ,  but  must  learn that while  the  name  is a  label for  t hem , 
the  you--rs  not.  The  people  who  speak  to  children  refer  to 
themselves  as  mommy  or  daddy  etc.,  etc. ,  or  as  I .  Children  can 
address  them  as  mommy  or  daddy,  but  not  as  I .  Ta  use  the  deictic 
terms  correctly,  with  themselves  at  center,  children  must  have 
grasped  how  other  people  use  them,  all with  them selves  at  center. 
(Tanz  1980:7.) 
Not  half-blind  "ego"-centeredness,  but  centeredness  in the  sense  of 
intrinsic  orientation  of  meanings  to  corresponding 
speech-situational reference  points  lS  wh at characterises  deixis . 
Now  there is a  vast  category  of meanings  that are  indeed  systema-
tically relative to the  given  speaker,  meanings  that have  often  been 
characterised  as  being  "subjective"  in  essence,  and  many  of which  have 32 
been  thought to  be  deictic on  the  grounds  of their speaker-relativity. 
Mood  including  affirmation  belongs  here,  gradations  of  affirmativity 
(probably,  perhaps ...  ),  expressions  of  aesthetic,  'social' ,  and 
practical evaluation  (beautiful,  unkind,  adequate,  unfortunately, ...  ), 
the expression  of attitude via  intonation  and  choice  of  vocabulary, 
much  of so-called social deixis,  etc.  In  any  instance of use,  any  of 
the  signs  or  features  in  question  counts  as  a  commitment  on  the 
speaker's  side  - a  commitment  to  a  certain  'truth value',  a  commitment 
relation  between  the  to  an  evaluation,  a  commitment  as  regards  the 
interactants,  etc.  The  meanings  in  question 
background  of  the  shared  knowledge  about 
are  interpreted  on  the 
the  speaker  his 
level  of  expressivity  reliability,  informedness,  competence,  usual 
etc.,  and  are  booked  to his  account  rather  than  taken  directly  as 
representations  of properties  of the thematic  world  segment. 
It seems  clear that the  signs  and  features  in  question  should  be 
assigned  a  deictic  component,  depending  and  in  turn reflecting  as  they 
do,  in their interpretation,  on  the  shared  knowledge  about  the  known 
individual who  uses  them,  just like  I . 
The  "subjectivity"  they  express  is,  of  course,  entirely 
intersubjective,  - "conventional subjectivity",  one  might  say.  It  is 
based  on  a  system  of social demands  and  responsibilities.  A speaker is 
socially required to make  reliable  statements,  and  to  qualify  his 
assertions,  if necessary,  so  as to  indicate the  degree  of reliability; 
this  includes  the  requirement  of  competent  evaluation  (can  I 
confidently take the route to  some  mountain  viewpoint  speaker  has 
recommended  to  me  as  "not  steep"?) .  A  speaker  is  also  socially 
required  to  do  what  is  sometimes  misleadingly  called  "express 
himself":  express  attitudes toward  the  interlocutor  and  toward  the 
things  spoken  about  (expression  of  a  'neutral'  attitude  lS  an 
expression  of attitude in itself,  with  a  conventional  value 
from  the  system  of available  options) .  Failure to  do  so  if 
with  a  speaker  counts  as  a  kind  of sociopathy;  on  a  specific 




type  of 
speech  event,  or is imputable to extraordinary  circumstances) ,  it will 
be  heard  as  'implicating' ,  with  Grice,  some  special message. 
We  have  to  do  here  with  the  domain  of language  functions  that  have 
been  set off  against  the  representational  function  under  various 
designations:  the  plane  of expression,  with  Bühler  (and  perhaps  also 
that of his  "Appell") ;  the  interpersonal function,  with  Halliday.  To 
me,  Halliday's tripartite  schema  of  functions  (the  ideational  or 33 
content function,  the  interpersonal or social role function ,  and  the 
textual or  discourse  function)  seems  the most  adequate  (for  what  it 
covers;  certainly aesthetic functions  must  also  find  their place,  and 
perhaps still others);  his  'interpersonal'  function  in  particular  lS 
"the ...  function  whereby  the  speaker  enters  into  the  communication 
process  in  its  social  and  personal  aspects",  the  function  that 
expresses  "speaker's  involvement"  (Halliday  1970:325f).  Functions  of 
this domain  are  systematically reflected in the  grammar,  in  lexical 
choice,  etc.,  after Halliday  (1970:326f) . 
It seems  that the functional  plane  adumbrated  here,  the  domain  of 
'interpersonal'/  'expressive'  functions,  in fact  extends all  the  way 
to  more  complex  schemata  of  language  use  metaphor,  irony, 
"performing"  in  narration  and  other genres.  Of  course,  more  than  just 
the  'interpersonal'  or  expressive  function  is  needed  to  characterise 
those  procedures;  but their use  is integrated in  a  system  of  social 
conventions  and  implies  a  specific  commitment  on  the  part  of  the 
speaker.  To  that extent,  a  speaker-deictic  component  is  involved  (in 
literary analysis,  in fact,  we  may  draw  information  about  the  figure 
of the  narrator,  e.g.,  from  the  metaphors  the  author  has  hirn  use) . 
Choice  of lexical register for  politeness  has  been  included  under 
deixis  in  Anderson/Keenan  1985:261,  and  it is a  short step  from  here 
to  including  the  speaker-relative  component  of schemata  such  as  those 
underlying  ('creative')  metaphor,  irony,  or,  for that matter,  much  of 
deictic  projection.  We  should  add  that  there  is,  beyond  the 
requirements  on  speakers  already  mentioned,  a  very  strong  one  to 
'speak weIl';  not  in the  sense  of schoolmasterly  correctness  (although 
to  some,  this is important,  tOD),  but  in  that  of  vivid,  evocatory, 
succinct,  allusive,  witty  ...  (or at times:  blunt,  ...  )  formulation. 
The  aesthetic functions  in  language  are related,  inter alia,  to  this 
requirement. 
Instead  of  "subjectivity",  then,  what  we  see  is  a  socially 
regulated  domain  of communicationally  vital,  but  non-representational, 
functions.  "Subjectivity"  is a  term  commonly  opposed  to  the  socially 
constituted;  it  is  misleading  especially  because  it  corroborates 
widespread  unreflected  assumptions  about  language.  The  phenomena  it 
has  been  used  to  capture  are  better  described  on  the  basis  of  a 
differentiated theory  of the  basic  language  functions. 34 
7.  Deixis  and  the  definition of the  speech  situation.  (Concerning 
the  inventory  of deictics. )  In all we  have  seen  so  far,  it has  become 
clear that it cannot  be  the function  of  deixis  to  relate  utterance 
contents to  concreta  of the  utterance  setting.  But  this  does  not 
invalidate the  old  faunding  intuition of the deictics'  relativity  to 
the  circumstances  of each  of their  uses,  to  the  individual  speech 
situations; it is only  the  concretistic interpretation  that  distorts 
the facts.  After all,  factars  like those  we  have  seen  at  work,  the 
interlocutors'  identities  and  the  concerns  and  shared  contexts 
addressed,  are  vital ingredients of any  speech  situation.  It  is  just 
that  we  must  give the  nation  of speech  situation its proper  sense. 
It is amazing  how  the theory  of  deixis,  presumably  a  pragmatic 
domain  par excellence,  is operating  under  a  concretistic conception  of 
the  speech  situation that has  remained  virtually  waterproof  to  the 
interactionally-oriented research  of  the  past  decades.  If  nothing 
else,  everyday  use  of  the  ward  situation  should  warn  us  against 
reducing the  concept to an  assembly  of externals  such  as  time,  place, 
and  speech  role  incumbency  ("just imagine  the situation  I  was  in!"; 
"that'll make  the  situation even  worse !" ... ) .  Such  reduction  mlsses 
the  very  essence  of the  nation,  the  action  and  dramatic  tension, 
participants'  i nterests and  expectations.  Admittedly,  the  nation  is 
not  an  easy  one  to define;  as  an  approximation,  we  may  perhaps  say 
that what  the  nation  aims  at  is  a  configuration  of  factars  that 
matter,  under  same  cancern  or interest,  at a  given  juncture.  I  have 
found  no  outright definition  in  the  literature,  but  Gaffman  1974 
paraphrases  "situational": 
"My  perspective  <in  the  book,  AF>  is situational,  meaning  here  a 
cancern  for  what  one  individual  can  be  alive  to  at  a  particular 
moment,  this often  involving  a  few  other particular individuals and 
not  necessarily restricted to the mutually  monitored  arena  of  a 
face-ta-face  gathering."  (Gaffman  1974:8) 
and  continues: 
"I  assume  that when  individuals attend to any  current  situation, 
they  face  the  question:  'What  is it that' s  going  on  here?'  Whether 
asked  explicitly,  as  in times  of confusion  and  doubt,  or  tacitly, 
during  occasions  of usual  certitude,  the  question is put  and  the 
answer  to it is presumed  by  the  way  the  individuals  then  proceed 
to get  on  with  the affairs at  hand."  (ibid.) 
A situation is a  complex  social construct  and  is not  definable  on  the 
basis  of inspection with  the  naked  eye.  Even  a  hause  afire  does  not  by 
itself make  wh at would  be  referred to  as  "the  situation"  in  every 
given  case;  the  concept  presupposes  an  interested  party,  or 
'evaluator',  and  a  configuration  of  background  assumptions, 35 
expectations,  often  obligations,  etc.  1 
Asp e  e  c  h  situation will at any  moment  be  defined  by  factors 
at two  principal l evel s .  First of al l ,  it is  wh  at  we  might  call  a 
moment  in life,  where  people  with  defined  identities,  with  a  shared 
world  and  shared  interests,  are,  at  a  certain  point  in  their 
interactional  history  and  in  t he  history of their worlds,  engaged  i n 
business  consequential to t hem  and  to those  worl ds .  In  addition,  a 
speech  situation is a  situation  'of speech',  with  the  frames ,  norms 
and  expectations  proper to this medium  of acti on .  Deictic  theory  has 
unduly  isol ated the  'situation of speech'  aspect,  and  in  a  superficial 
manner  at  that.  (I  am  using  speech  in  a  broad  sense,  of  course:  any 
kind  of verbal  action,  i ncl uding ,  mutatis  mutandi s ,  t hose  in  pri nt  and 
on  stone.) 
Utterances  are  moves  i n  interactional  episodes,  or  'dramata ' 
(however trivial or  i mpersonal t he  embedding  speech  event  may  appear 
at times) .2  Interaction  has  many  dimensions  and  is structured at  many 
layers,  so  t hat situations  may  be  del imited at  different  levels:  we 
often refer to  "the"  speech  situation t hroughout  some  interaction  when 
we  are  interested in the  factors that remain  constant,  but  since  every 
utterance  attends to the interactional  st at e  t hat obtains  when  it  is 
made  and  changes  t hat state,  we  must  also  say  t hat  every  utterance 
creates  a  new  situati on;  and  t here  are  levels of structure in  between, 
of course. 
In  characterising  what  participants  must  be  'alive  to'  at  any 
moment,  i .e.  what makes  up  a  speech  situation,  we  must  take  i nto 
account the  individual s  engaged  in it i n  their 
(to  the  extent  t hat  attributes  of  t hose 
full  individualities 
i ndividualities  are 
intersubj ectively  presupposed  or  manifested,  of course,  and  only  i n 
those  aspects  t hat are relevant  to t he  given  i nteraction) ;  t he  social 
and  affective relations  between  them ;  t heir  known  lang-range  and 
ad-hoc  intentions;  the  shared  'world  segments'  ,the  given  interaction 
concerns,  in all those  aspect s  that are  shared  and  may  be  relevant  to 
the  present  concern;  t he  stage reached  in t he  present  i nteraction,  t he 
projected  course  of the  interaction as  weIl  as  what has  gone  before, 
including  relevant  aspects  of  previous  interactions;  norms  and 
expectations  associated  with  the  thematic  contents;  interacti onal 
norms  or  'maxims ',  and  more  (thus  the  social  definition  of  the  place 
where  t he  interaction takes  place  may  be  a  relevant speech-situational 
factar:  being  in  a  church,  e.g.,  wi l l  have  repercussions  on  the 
loudness  with  which  t wo tourists  exchange  their  remarks ;  but  such 36 
aspects  are  not relevant  to  our  discussion) . 
N etworks  of fact ors  like the  ones  just hinted  at form  the  background 
to the  production  and  interpretation of any  utterance  and  its  diverse 
elements;  i n  fact ,  t hey  are  wh at  the  speakers  address  in  their 
utterances,  what makes  them  formulate  t he  utterances  they  formulate . 
(In  t he  literatur e,  situational  factors  are  often treated  as  a  kind  of 
'noise'. )  I  tentatively group  the  factors  under  three  categories: 
(1)  factors  t o  do  with  the  shared-knowledge  'world  segment '  the 
utterance  addresses; 
(2)  factors  concerning  the  course  of the  given  interaction  (at  the 
'thematic'  as  weIl  as  the  personaljsocial level) ; 
(3)  factors  to  do  with  the  personal  and  social relations. 
The  grouping  not inaptly parallels t he  distinction of  basic  language 
functions  discussed  in  t he  last section  - "not 
stands to reason that the  functions  served  by 
shoul d  be  geared to t he  factors that make  up 
rather  on  behal f  of which  they  are  used . 
inaptly"  because  it 
linguistic  expressions 
the  situations  in  or 
The  individual  configurations  of  factors  vary  infinitely,  of 
course,  but  t hey  are  made  up  of factors  of recurrent  types. 
If we  take  a  deictic to  be  a  sign  whose  meaning  is defined relative 
to  a  recurrent type  of  speech-situational factor  - a 
that should  not  meet  with  too  m uch  objection  and 
realistic conception  of  what t he  types  of factors  are 
characterisation 
start  from  a 
that  make  up 
speech  situations,  we  can  easily  incl ude  in  the  definition  the  many 
kinds  of meaning  t hat  have  at  one  time  or other  been  characterised  as 
deictic  but  have  been  difficult  to  integrate  under  the  prevailing 
conception  (cf.  sections  1  and  6) . 
In the  followi ng  list,  the  systematisation is imperfect,  but  I  hope 
it will suffice to illustrate the  point  I  am  making .  I  distinguish the 
designative  component ,  or  'value',  of each  sign  or  pattern  from  the 
type  of  speech-situational  factor  t his  value  is  relative  to  or 
presupposes,  its reference  point.  Numbers  (1) ,  (2) ,  (3)  behind  the 
type  of reference  point  are meant  to indicate the  gross  category  of 
situational factor it belongs  to.  The  functional  characterisations are 
approximative  and  possible  polysemies  neglected.  Note  that  a  number  of 
meanings  are relative to more  t han  one  kind  of factor. 
- THE  DEFINITE  ARTICLE:  The  ' uniqueness '  value  conferred  by  it upon 
the referent of t he  noun  is relative to  an  appropriate thematic  'world 
segment'  ("intended  pragmatic  uniqueness  set" ,  with  Hawkins  1984)  (1) . 
Thus ,  with  an  example  of Hawkins ',  the  noun  president  is  associated 37 
(inter alia)  with  a  country  someone  is  president  of;  the  president 
will  be  heard  as  referring to the  president of the  country  we  are just 
speaking  of,  or to the  president  of the  country  we  are  in. 
- DISCOURSE  CONNECTORS  AND  PARTICLES : 
Incidentally.  Val ue :  "not  exactly  dovetailed" ,  relative 
to:  the  present  concern  (2) . 
- apropos.  Value :  "Mention  warranted  by  related  t hematic 
content" ,  relative to:  some  name ,  concept, fact . . .  just spoken  of  (1), 
(2) . 
- German  ja  (wir  haben ' s  ja;  ich  war  ja mal  in  Mexico  "we're  not 
poor,  after all";  "I  I ve  been  to  Mexico ,  after  all") .  Value : 
Validating  argument,  relative to:  proposal  or assertion just m ade  (2) 
("let's  go  first class";  "Mexicans  are  friendl y/unfriendly/ . . . ") 
- CONJUNCTIONS : 
- but  (they  were  poor,  but  merry)  Value :  refut ation  of 
possible  inference  based  on  stereotypical  associations  (1)  to  t he 
content of the  antecedent  phrase  (1) ,  (2) . 
- VERBAL  ASPECT :  Perfect-like  and  past-like  tenses  differ  i n 
instructing  t he  hearer  to  (value:)  compute  the  relevance  of  the 
predicated fact relative to a  present  concern  (2)  either  immediately 
or via  the relevance to  an  evoked  situat ion  (1) . 
- SENTENCE  ACCENT : 
Non-contrastive  accent  on  the  subject  (M y  pOrse  is  gone!) 
tells t he  hearer to  evaluate t he  predication  as  that  of  an  event, 
introduced into the  present t hematic  context  (1)  and  argumentation  (2) 
"as  a  whole"  rather  than  for  separate  relevance  consideration  of 
subject and  predicate. 
value  - 'Iterative'  accent  as  in  When  did  t hey  come?  has  the 
of acknowledging,  for the  (at least propositional)  content of  subj ect 
that  it  +  predicate  (e .g.,  "they  came")  of t he  present ~ttera n ce  (2) 
has  been  at issue  before. 
- "STYLE  DISJUNCTS"  (with  a  t erm  from  Greenbaum  1969) : 
- Frankly  (frankly,  he 's  not  too  intelligent;  frankly,  I  don 't 
know) .  The  value,  approximately,  is:  "(I  know  delicate  matt ers  must 
often  be  expressed  in  a  r oundabout  way,  and  what  I  am  going  to  say  is 
delicate,  but,  in this  case,  I  think it's  preferable)  to  call  things 
by  their name";  it is relative to the  given  speaker's  person,  goes  to 
his  account  (3),  and  presupposes the  norm  of verbal  conduct  formul ated 38 
in the  parenthesis  (3) . 
- "SENTENCE  MODE"  (Question,  affirmation,  imperative): 
- Affirmation.  Value:"I  can  vouch  for the truth of the fact  in 
question".  Relative to such  traits of  speaker's  personality  (3)  as 
informedness,  competence,  sanity  of judgment .... Counts  as  the  given 
speaker' s  (3)  commitment  in relation to the requirement  for  speakers 
to make  their assertions reliable  (3) . 
- MOOD 
- Inferential,  e.g.  the  inferential  use  of  future  tense 
("where' s  Peter?"  - "oh,  helll be  watehing  TV" ) .  Value:  I  have  no 
positive information that  x is the  case,  but  from  wh at  information  I 
have,  plus  my  experience etc.,  I  can  infer that it iso  Counts  as  the 
given  speaker's  (3)  commitment,  etc.  as  above. 
- EPISTEMIC  QUALIFIERS  (certainly,  probably  etc.)  can  be  described 
along  the  same  lines. 
- ' DEONTIC'  MODAL  VERBS  such  as  must,  should  express  va lues  that 
are relative to the  given  speaker's  (3)  evaluation  of  appropriate 
courses  of  action  in  the  thematic  domain  (1);  they  count  as 
commitments  in regard to the  social requirement  upon  speakers to  take 
a  stand  in  moral  issues  under  appropriate  conditions  (3) . 
- EVALUATIVE  ADJECTIVES  AND  ADVERBS  (beautiful,  good ;  stupidly, 
sadly,  fortunately):  the  va lues  expressed  are relative  to  the  given 
speaker's  evaluation  and  count  as  his  commitments  (3);  they  may  be 
relative to  social ly  shared  norms  associated with the  thematic  world 
segment  (1)  (standards  of  beauty  for  paintings,  women ... ;  of 
intelligence for actions ...  ),  and  to ad-hoc  concerns  (3)  (as  when  I  am 
trying to extract a  nail from  a  wall  and  you  pass  me  a  pair  of 
scissors,  which  I  give  back  to  you  saying  "they're  no  good" 
for the  purpose  in  question,  not  in  themselves) . 
- INTONATION : 
- An  'endearing'  tone  of  voice,  e.g.,  counts  as 
commitment  (3)  in relation to requirements  of  expressing 




Quite  a  number  of the  meanings  listed above  are  'metalocutionary' 
(Gibbon  1982)  in the  sense  of expressing  not  features  of the  thematic 
world,  but indications  about  how  to  interpret the material they  are  in 
construction with.  I  have  left this  out  of the discussion  in  order  not 
to  confound  deictic relationality,  i .e.  relativity to factors  in  the 39 
situation,  with  intra-sentential relationality.  In  asense,  of course, 
the intra-sentential context is  'in the situation',  too,  but  the  two 
kinds  of relationality  should  certainly  be  kept  apart  so  as  not  to 
blur the specificity of the traditional notion  of  deictic  relations. 
At  some  higher  level  of  abstraction,  commonalities  (as  weIl  as 
specific differences)  will probably  appear.  In  any  case,  not  only  for 
the  'metalocutionary',  but  for all deictics and  in fact  for all  types 
of sign,  the  kind  of intrasentential relations they  contract should  be 
part of a  full functional  description.  (Where  a  deictic is relative to 
the  content  of a  preceding  or following  utterance,  however,  I  speak  of 
a  deictic relation,  as  is more  or less traditional in  the  domain  of 
'discourse deixis';  cf.  the  characterisation of the  German  particle ~ 
above. ) 40 
8.  "Deictic projection".l Let  us  go  back  to the  question,  mentioned 
in the  introductory  section,  of  non-"canonical"  reference  points: 
places  and  times  other than  the  'given '  ones,  a  person  other  than 
speaker as  source  of evaluations  and  expressive  traits,  a  situation 
other than  the  current  one  as  'relevance target'  of a  predication ... 
Two  cases  must  be  distinguished: 
1)  There  are  deictic  signs  that  occur  only  with  'transferred' 
reference  points,  such  as  there,  then,  <seven  days>  earlier  (as 
against  <seven  days>  ago),  certain  tensejaspect 
English  Past),  etc.  2  I  call  this  phenomenon 
orientation;  more  detail ed  treatment  (and  the 
markers  (e.g.,  the 
(explicit)  secondary 
exact  delimitation 
against  'deictic  projection '  at  the  functional  level)  must  be 
deferred. 
2)  A given  deictic sign  or feature  may  be  oriented,  in  discourse, 
either to  a  'primary',  or  speech-situational,  reference  point  such  as 
those  discussed  up  to  now ,  or to  a  'transferred '  reference  point  (a 
reference  point  in  some  'established'  or  evoked  situation) .  What  is 
usually  ca lIed  'deictic projection '  belongs  in this rubric,  and  more . 
I  adopt  the  term  'projection'  to  cover  all  orientation  to 
'transferred'  reference  points  of this second  type. 
Between  them ,  phenomena  of  the  two  types  make  orientation  to 
'transferred'  reference  points  ubiquitous. 
Type  2,  deictic projection in the  sense  sketched,  ranges  from  uses 
with  very  marked  effects,  such  as  those  usually  discussed  under  terms 
like point-of-view technique,  to  grammaticalised  patterns  such  as 
those illustrated on  p.4 for tensejaspect  use,  patterns that  are  the 
most  usual  way  of  expressing  the  relations  in  question  in  the 
languages  concerned  and  whose  projectional character  emerges  mainly  on 
a  comparative  basis.  (Another  grammaticalised  projection  is  at  the 
base  of generalising  you  as  in  you  never  know;  projection  is  we  may 
say  contextually lexicalised  i n  ca ses like  I 'm caming  in  answer  to  a 
summons ,  where  the  addressee's  point  of view  is taken rather than  the 
speaker's . ) 
Let  us  recall the  example  quoted  from  Fillmore  1982  on  p.5,  and  his 
discussion  of it: 
(50)  Several  years  aga,  he  had  lived  near the  beach. 
" ...  what  is being  presented is t he  inner experience  of  a  central 
character,  the  'he '  of t he  passage.  It  is  precisely  the 
deictic effect associated with  t he  word  which  is  responsible  for 
the  communicated  'point of view'.  What  justifies me  in  describing 
<this  use>  as  non-deictic is its not  being  anchored  in t he  current 
speech  event ...  "  (Fillmore  1982:38) . 41 
If the  effect  observed is due  to the deictic character of ago,  and  if, 
ta  king  the situation of the  central  character as  reference  point,  aga 
functions  in relation to it exactly  as it would  in  relation  to  the 
speech  situation if this latter were  taken  as  reference  point,  then 
wh at  we  have  is a  difference in  deictic orientation,  not  a  difference 
between  deictic  and  non-deictic  use.  We  may  cover the  difference  with 
a  terminological  distinction  such  as  primary  vs .  transferred 
orientation  ("primary"  vs .  "secondary"  might  seem  more  logical,  but 
for the  moment  I  reserve the label  secondary  orientation  for  cases 
with  explicit  marking  such  as  mentioned  above  under  point  1)) . 
Contrary to  current mainstream  thinking,  quite  a  few  authors  have 
indeed  insisted that the  difference  between  'primary'  (or  immediately 
speech-situational)  and  'transferred'  orientation is a  mere  difference 
of use,  and  that deixis  must  be  defined  in  a  fashion  independent  of 
such  differences.  To  quote  but  two  voices,  a  less recent  and  a  very 
re  cent  one : 
"Die  'Deixis  am  Phantasma '  besagt,  daß  der  betroffenen  Zeigfunktion 
ein fiktives  und  nicht  das  der  Realität  des  Sprechereignisses 
entsprechende  Zeigfeld  zu  Grunde  liegt.  Sie  unterscheidet  sich 
somit  von  der  'eigentlichen'  Deixis  ausschließlich  auf  der  Ebene 
der als  parole  verstandenen  Sprache."  <Note:>  "Nur  die  Existenz als 
solche  des  Zeigfelds ist ein  die  als  langue  verstandene  Sprache 
betreffendes  Phänomen,  nicht jedoch  die  jeweilige  Fixierung  seines 
Koordinaten-Nullpunktes."  ("'Deixis  am  Phantasma '  means  that  the 
deictic function  in  question is  based  on  a  fictive  deictic  field 
rather than  on  the  one  that  corresponds  to  the  reality  of  the 
speech  event.  Consequently,  it  differs  from  deixis  'proper' 
exclusively at the level of  language  in  the  sense  of  parole." 
<Note:>  "It is only  the  existence  as  such  of the deictic field that 
concerns  language  in the  sense  of langue,  not the  ad-hoc  fixation 
of the  zero-point for its coordinates.")  (H eger  1963:19) 
"<The>  capacity  to  project  transposed,  fictional,  or  narrated 
indexical frames  is basic to  communication;  it is a  design  feature 
of shifters."  (Hanks  1990:180) 
There  are  two  possible interpretations of such  a  tenet:  Under  one, 
a  deictic is simply  neutral with  respect to  primary  vs .  transferred 
orientation,  and  it does  not  make  any  difference  whether  primary  or 
transferred  points  of reference  are  chosen;  under  t he  other,  ' primary' 
reference  points  are  primary  in  some  functional  sense  as  weIl,  and 
transferred  ones  functionally  derived.  We  seem  to  need  the  second 
interpretation - which  is closer to the  prevailing  conception  in 
order to  account  for the  marked  effects  so  often  associated  with 
projection  ('point-of-view'  etc.),  but the first one  (where,  as  in the 
statement  by  Heger,  choice  of transferred reference  points is  just  a 
special  case  of the  definitional  'shifting '  of  deictics)  seems  more 42 
appropriate  when  we  deal  with  projection  in  grammar,  or  with  such 
items  as  local,  contemporary,  current,  already,  which  occur  just  as 
freely  with transferred reference  points  as  with  'primary'  ones . 
There  is less  contradiction  between  the  two  interpretations  than 
appears,  if we  differentiate contexts of use,  and  take  into  account 
phenomena  of language-specific  automatisation  (among  which  certain 
types  of grammaticalisation) . 
Orientation to  'primary'  reference  points  is  certainly  to  be 
regarded  as  basic in  a  systematic  sense.  Without  arguing  this  here 
(some  justification also  emerges  from  the  very  way  the  'stylistic' 
effects of projection  are  to  be  characterised),  let  us  note  the 
indirect evidence  deriving  from  the  existence  in  all  languages  (it 
seems)  of  'secondary-orientation'  deictics  (p .  40),  deictics 
specialised for  orientation to situations other than that  of  speech, 
but  with  one  component,  the  one  usually  indicated via  such  terms  as 
distal,  relativising them  to the  situation of speech  as  weIl. 
Orientation to transferred reference  points is a  specific  procedure 
with  effects of its own,  comparable  in  many  ways  to  metaphor.  In 
metaphor,  the  use  of a  sign  is extended to  a  content in  a  'universe  of 
discourse'  not  normally  associated with it;  in  'deictic  projection', 
the  definitional  'here-and-now'  situational schema  of  interpretation 
lS  extended to a  situation that is not  actually  our  present  one . 
The  best  semantic  theory  at  present  to  my  knowledge  for  a 
differentiated  analysis  of such  phenomena  is the  "frame  semantics"  as 
developed  by  Fillmore.  In  two  rich  papers  (1977,1985),  Fillmore  shows 
- in particular,  but  not  only,  for  lexical semantics  how  meanings 
are  based  on  and  activate  "background<s>  of  knowledge  and  practices" 
(1985:224) ,  "coherent  schematizations  of  experience"  (1985:223), 
"presupposed  structure<s>  of relationships against  which  words ...  are 
understood" (1985:224) ,  their "interpretive frames"  (passim). 
The  "presupposed  structure of relationships against which"  deictics 
are  understood  is,  of course,  situational.  I  have  tried to suggest,  in 
the last section,  what  this implies  - including  a  dramatic  element  and 
a  filtering  through the  view  of an  'evaluator' .  Being  tailor-made  to 
fit and  complement  the  situationally-shared,  the  deictic  meanings 
necessarily  carry  with  them  the  presupposition  of a  shared  situation 
'here  and  now',  a  situational schema .  In the  standard  type  of  use, 
'primary'  orientation,  this schema  lS  so  to  speak  absorbed  by  the 
appropriate  factors  of the  current  situation.  But  very  often,  the 
meaning  of a  deictic  cannot  be  relativised to  the  current  situation 43 
and  must  be  related to  some  other  contextually  eligible  one ,  for 
instance a  currently  evoked  narrative  one  (+  " ...  at that moment  I  knew 
it had  to  be  now, .. . ").  Over  and  above  the  purely  designative  element 
in  the  meaning  of now,  which  will,  when  applied  to  that  situation, 
yield  a  temporal  interpretation,  there  lS  the  ' here-and-now' 
situational schema  lingering,  which  invites  the  listen  er  to  invoke 
elements  of the  narrated  situation  to  interpretively  saturate  its 
constitutive elements  - the  dramatic  tension,  the  view  through  an 
'evaluator's'  eyes,  etc.  The  projectional effect of  the  now  clearly 
contrasts with  the effect of the  preceding  at  that  moment .  At  that 
moment  is formulated  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  interactional 
situation,  with  the  'distancing '  that  (a  'secondary- orientation' 
element,  cf.  above) :  we  'look  upon '  the  narrated  situation;  to 
contextualise the  'now',  we  must  for  a  moment  step  into that situation 
as it would  present itself to a  participant. 
As  stressed  before,  such  procedures  are  by  no  means  limited  to 
fictional literature.  An  example  from  spontaneous  discourse: 
(41)  (During  a  dinner  conversation,  A.  is telling  how  he  once,  on 
his  way  through  Northern  Italy to  catch  t he  ferry  to  Sardinia,  could 
not resist the temptation to visit some  museum :) 
Morgen  abend  ging  erst das  Schiff,  es  war  nicht  mehr  sehr weit,  ich 
dachte,  das  schaffst du  ganz  gemütlich ... 
(The  boat  was  not  sailing until tomorrow  night,  t here  wasn 't  much 
of a  distance left,  I  thought  you 're  going  to  make  it comfortably ...  ) . 
Different  contexts will give  different  degrees  of  'resonance '  to 
the  lingering  components  of  t he  situational  schema  in  projection; 
hence  different effects  of the  procedure.  (This  in  turn  lS  analogous 
to what  we  observe  with  metaphor,  cf.  Birus/Fuchs  1988:165)  In  the 
classical example  of literary  'point-of-view'  technique,  3rd  person 
narrative,  narrator and  protagonist  are  different  persons,  and  to 
interpretively  saturate  the  'evaluator's  view '  element  of  the 
situational schema,  the listener will invoke  elements to  do  with  the 
protagonist's personality  and  situation to  a  strong  degree.  If what  is 
being  said is very  private  or  'subjective'/expressive,  this  will  add 
to the effect  ("transparent minds",  with  the title of Cohn  1978) .  In 
'blank-check'  projection,  on  the other hand,  a  very  frequent  though 
little described  pattern of use  (ex .s  42  to 44),  where  a  deictic  is 
used  within  a  generalising  statement,  there  lS  no  contextually 
available specific situation to relativise the  deictic  to,  and  the 
result is evokation  of a  situational schema  per  se. (42)  ... if one  hears  a  "ticktock"  of a  clock,  t he 
remembered  in t he  way  in  which  a  "ticktock"  10 




is  not 
aga  is 
(43)  (In  a  conversation  among  physicists.  Is meteorology  a  branch 
of physics?  A :  Ves,  of course.  B:) 
Nur  mit  dem  Vorhersagen ist's  so 'ne  Sache.  Und  die  Leute  wollen 
halt wissen,  wie  morgen  's  Wetter ist.  (It 's  just prediction that is a 
problem.  And  people  want  to  know  what  the  weather's  going  to  be  like 
tomorrow. ) 
(44)  (About  Rorschach  tests)  To  interpret such  a  blot  as,  say,  a 
bat or  a  butterfly means  some  act  of perceptual  classification  in 
the filing  system  of  my  mind  I  pigeonhole it with  butterflies  I  have 
seen  or dreamt  of.  (Gombrich  1972:183.) 
Beside  different  types  of  interaction  with  the  context 
("resonance",  etc.) ,  a  or the  main  parameter  accounting  for  the  wide 
range  of  variation  in  the  effects  of  projection  is  that  of 
'creativity'  vs .  'usuality'  or  automatisation.  Again,  the situation is 
parallelIed in  metaphor.  Just as  we  have  a  'creativity range '  from  the 
completely  spontaneous  via  the  semi-usual,  the  usual,  etc.,  down  to 
the so-called  dead  metaphor  (the  stool's  leg),  there is a  range  from 
the  we  may  say  creative,  spontaneous  projection  through  projection 
more  or less usual  in t he  language  in  certain contexts  and  with  given 
lexical items  (I'm coming  i n  answer to a  summons ,  contemporary  etc. 
with  'transferr ed '  orientation)  to  grammaticalised  projection  as  in 
3  the tense/aspect  examples  on  p.4  (cf.  p.  40) . 45 
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1.  Introduction 
*  The  present  paper  contains  part  of  what  is  to  appear  as  a 
monograph ,  probably  toward  t he  end  of next  year.  I  thank  Hansjakob 
Seiler for the  opportunity to  publish this  first  instalment  in  his 
akup  series,  and  Dick  Geiger  for  reading  most  of  the  manuscript  and 
correcting mistakes  in  my  English.  Comments and  criticism  are  highly 
welcome  at this stage. 
Due  to  a  sudden  serious  incident,  I  have 
torso,  and  omit  t he  projected  Conclusion.  For 
t he  bibliographical i ndications are  not  quite 
to  leave  section  8  a 
t he  same  reason,  some  of 
complet e. 
1  "Spatiotemporal  context" ,  in t his  quotation,  is  indeed  defined 
via  speaker's  location  and  mom ent  of utterance: 
n  • ••  the  spatiotemporal zero-point  (the  here-and-now)  is  determined 
by  t he  place  of the  speaker at t he  moment  of  utterance ...  "  (ibid. 
638) . 
2  Definite articl e:  Ebert  1971  passim.  Mood :  Jakobson  1957,  Brecht 
1974.  Voice:  Benveniste  1956:255 .  Verbal  aspect:  Benveniste  ibid., 
Heger  1963 ,  cf.  also  Fuchs  1988:5,  1991.  Sentence  accent:  Ladd  1979 , 
Gibbon  1982;  cf.  also  Fuchs  1980.  Word  order variation:  Levinson  1983: 
88f.  Conjunctions:  Bühler  1934/1982  (with  references  to  earlier 
authors) .  "Discourse  markers"  and  particles:  Gornik-Gerhardt  1981:13, 
Schiffrin  1987.  Choice  of register:  Anderson/Keenan  1985 :261 . 
3  Norms  as  reference  points:  cf.  Leisi 1971 :101-105,  Clark  1974 . 
4  Actually,  it  is found  alr eady  in  Brugmann  1904  (10f;  cf.  also 
ibid.  p.  15) . 
5  For  Spanish,  cf.  Hottenroth  198  :140.  With  respect to  M aya ,  and 
more  generally,  see  now  Hanks  1990 :20 . 
6  N ot  always  does  t he  acknowledgement  go  so  far  as 
following  statement:  "A  careful  examination  of  extended 
demonstrative  categories  even  in  English  could  easily  be  of 
length".  (Fillmore  1982 : 53) 
in  the 
uses  of 
monograph 
7  E.g. ,  Anderson/Keenan  1985:278 ,  Schiffrin  1991:219;  an  approach 
in  terms  of  prototypicality  is  Fillmore  1982 .  For  Brugmann 
(1904:15),  the  difference  was  one  of  phylogenet ically  primitive  vs . 
historically attested  use,  and  the  (assumed)  ,diachronie  primitivity 
was  held to warrant treating t he  patterns in  question  as  the  logically 
basic  ones;  a  similar  epistemic  relation  between  (more  implicit) 
phylogenetic  speculation  and  perceptive observation  of  actual  usage 
seems  to  be  what  explains the  discrepancy,  in  Bühler,  between  the 
concretistic  core  of his  theory  and  subtle analysis of  all  sorts  of 
usage  not  reconcilable  with  it.  (Assumptions  concerning  primitive 
stages  play  some  role in  prototypicality  approaches  as  weIl;  in regard 
to  deixis,  cf.  Fillmore  1982:49,  apropos  the  'medial'  distance 
category.) 
8  In  the  descriptive  tradition,  demonstratives  have  in  fact 
largely  been  treated together with  the  articles,  or  with  personal 
pronouns  (the latter also in  Isard  1975 ,  Linde  1979,  Ehlich  1982) , 
rather than  as  a  subtype  of spatial deictics  (Lyons  1977 :646ff  tries 46 
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to reconcile the  two  approaches).  - Ehlich's  "deictic"  must  be  read 
as  "demonstrative"  - one  instance of the frequent  equation of the  two 
notions  (another among  many  is Hanks  1990,  cf.  note  13). 
9  See,  in this sense,  e.g.,  Brecht  1974,  Latzel  1974,  Comrie  1985 
(e.g.,  the  discussion  in 1.5.),  Heger  1963.  For  the  German  and 
Portuguese  examples,  cf.  also  Fuchs  1988a  and  1988b. 
10  Fillmore  1975:2f explicitly criticises meaning  definitions  of 
the simplifying type  "movement  toward  speaker"  for  come.  For  options 
in  orienting the  German  prefixes  her-,  hin- (corresponding,  roughly, 
to the directional components  in  come  vS:-gojarrive),  Latzel1970. 
11  Politeness  phenomena:  especially  Brown  & Levinson  1985:123-127, 
209-211.  The  management  of narrative empathy  via  choice  of perspective 
has  been  analysed  above  all for literary fiction,  and  the  bibliography 
is too rich to  give  a  selection  here;  the  phenomenon  is not  limited to 
literary fiction,  however  (cf.  section 8). 
12  Fillmore  considers this  kind  of usa ge  unacceptable  in  ordinary 
deictic  to 
What  the 
discourse  (1982:38,  cf.  also ibid.  41  "the transfer  from 
non-deictic with its literary effect"),  which  it is not. 
distinction between  deictic and  so-called non-deictic  uses is 
capture is real enough  differences,  but they  are  differences 
types of deictic orientation;  cf.  section  8. 
meant  to 
between 
13  Against the concretistic slant of  the  prevailing  conception, 
see  now  also  Hanks  1990,  a  book  very  similar to the  present  treatment 
in its orientation to situated  use  and  to  the  socialjinteractional 
grounding  of deixis.  The  book  has  come  to  my  attention just  recently, 
but  I  incorporate references to  it  wherever  feasible  now;  a  more 
thorough  discussion will follow.  See  also  Weinrich  1971:32f.,  Fuchs 
1980:  459f. 
2.  "Here"  and  "now"  . 
1  Cf.  the  conversation-analytic  notion  of tellability;  see,  e.g., 
Coulthard  1977:75ff. 
2  Just as  the  boundaries of the reference  of a  given  now,  those 
of a  given  here,  a  given  we  are  not  necessarily  delimited  in  a 
metrically  precise sense,  the required  degree  of  precision  resulting 
from  context  (cf.  also recently,  soon,  etc.  etc.). 
3  I  have  not  commented  on  the  very first jetzt  in  the  extract, 
which  seems  to  have  yet  another type  of interpretation.  - Jetzt1  and 
jetzt  should,  actually,  probably  be  described  as  instances  of 
'deic~ic projection'  (cf.  section 8),  as  I  realised when  rereading  the 
analysis;  I  do  not think this interferes with the  point  being  made. 
4  Cf.  Klein  1990. 
5  Cf.,  e.g.,  the  following  definition:  "A  Locating  Expression, 
then,  is an  expression  by  which  a  Figure is said  to  be  at  a  Place 
identified with  reference to a  Ground.  In the particular ca se  of 47 
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deictic  Locating  expressions,  the  Ground  is the Speaker's  (or  in  some 
cases the  Hearer's)  body."  (Fillmore  1982:43.)  A little further  on  the 
same  page,  we  read,  apropos  the  Informing  function  of  Locating 
Expressions  (cf.  next  note): 
"The  Informing  function  can  be  achieved  deictically ...  by  means  of a 
reference to the Speaker's  current location,  as  seen  in  sentence  (24), 
interpreted  as  senten  ce  (25),  or ... 
(24)  She  lives here. 
(25)  She  lives in the  place  where  I  am  now." 
But  can  the  place where  "she  lives"  really  be  the  one  presently 
occupied  by  speaker's  body?  Fundamental  aspects  of the  definition  of 
'places'  are  being  glossed  over  here. 
6  For 
1982:43ff. 
a  differentiation  of  possible  functions,  see  Fillmore 
7  For  the  social/interactional  definition  of  'places', 
Schegloff's classic 1972  paper;  with  regard  to  deixis,  Hanks 
Relevant  change  as  the  basis  of  time  delimitation: 
1991:103f,106.  "'Given'"  in  "'given'  location"  ought  to 
explicated,  but for the  moment  I  cannot  do  that;  I  use it as  the 






8  For  paradigmatic  substitutability  as 
status,  see  Bosch  1983.  Here  is treated  as 
Brugmann  1904,  Schegloff 1972,  Hanks  1990. 
a 
a  criterion 
pro-element 
of  "pro" 
also  in 
9  I  cannot  substantiate this here,  but,  as  an  approximation,  cf. 
Hawkins'  characterisation of the  demonstratives,  wh ich  functionally 
parallel there  and  then;  see in particular point  (b): 
Very  briefIy,  the  speaker  can  be  said to  be  'doing'  the  following 
things,  or performing  the  following  acts of reference when  uttering 
a  demonstrative  (we  ignore  the  actual  distinction  between 
this/these and  that/those in this context):  He  (a)introduces  a 
referent  (or referents)  to the  hearer;  and  (b)  instructs the  hearer 
to match  this Iinguistic referent with  some  identifiable  object, 
where  identifiability means  either  (i)  visible in the situation  or 
(ii)  known  on  the  basis  of  previous  mention  in  the  discourse. 
(Hawkins  1978:152) 
For  then,  such  an  analysis  should  not  be  astonishing;  this deictic  is 
quite  nearIy  limited to  anaphoric  use  (verbal  establishment),  cf. 
Fillmore  1971:10  ("then  really  has  only  an  anaphoric  function"). 
(Schiffrin  1991:22~has  some  examples  df  establishment  via 
interactional focus  and  pointing). 
10  To  conclude,  a  concise  and  poetic statement of the  dependence  of 
deictic interpretation  on  the  thematic  context,  and  the  need  for 
inference,  by  a  linguistic layperson,  an  Indian  lady  I  occasionally 
converse  with  on  the  bus.  I  had  mentioned  the difficulties in  defining 
the  meanings  of even  such  simple  words  as  here,  and  that  a  common 
definition for  here is "speaker's Iocation at utterance time"  when  in 
fact  here  may  cover,  say,  the  whole  of Europe,  in  contradistinction to 
some  other continent.  Her  comment  was:  "It depends  on  what  you  want  to 
talk about.  One  has  to listen with  the inner ear". 48 
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3.  The  first and  second  person  pronouns . 
1  Cf.  the  beautiful  passage  regarding the  "subtil e  Verkehrstechnik 
des  Standpunktswechsels"  the  subtle  interactional  technique  of 
perspective  change  - in  Bühler  1934(1982) :374. 
2  Benveniste  uses  nous  (with  singular  agreement  i n  adjectives!) 
for self-reference,  in~e article  quoted,  so  that  no  ambiguity 
arises.  But  this of course is not  general  practice  any  more ;  besides, 
the  generalised  use  of I  is very  frequent  in  spoken  discourse,  cf. 
section  8. 
3  Misunderstandings  occur,  and  there  are  special  formulae  to 
forestall them ;  i n  German ,  one  often  hears  "sie mit  großem  s"  or  "sie 
mit  kleinem  s"  ("sie with  an  upper-case  s"  or  "sie with  a  lower-case 
s":  polite address is accomplished  via  3rd  person  plural sie,  which  in 
print is written with  an  upper-case  i nitial  letter  when  used  in 
address.  In  English,  I  have  repeatedly  heard  "I  don't  mean  you 
personally"  i n  cases  where  a  statement meant  as  a  generalisation might 
have  been  misunderstood  as  a  description  of addressee' s  way  of acting. 
4  For  1st person  plural,  see  also  the  instructive  examples  and 
discussion  in  Hanks  1990:171ff.  (The  "third  person  Included"  variant 
mentioned  174f is probably  not  grammaticalised to t he  same  degree  as 
the others;  it seems  parallel to what  we  find,  e.g.,  in  Russian:  my  s 
1vanom  ezdili v  Moskvu  "I went  to  Moscow  with  1van"  <lit.  "we  went 
with  Ivan">,  which  will  be  used  to  introduce  the  referents,  but 
substituted for  by  simple  my  "we"  in the  sequel.) 
5  We  may  add  here that,  contrary to  common  formulations,  so-called 
social deixis is not relative to  "participant roles" . 
4.  Defining  the  meanings  of the  deictics  so  far. 
1  The  relation  between  deictic  and  'designative'  features  should 
be  viewed  in  a  more  comprehensive  way  than is done  here  for  expository 
reasons.  Important  here  is  Seiler's  conception  of  the  functional 
complementarity  and  varying  dominance  of  'indicativity'  and 
'predicativity',  as  expounded  in Seiler 1986  and  many  other  places. 
5.  The  "spatio-temporal  zero-point" . 
1  In the  discussion after a  talk  where  I  once  said  this,  a 
participant remarked  that 500  years  aga  may  also  be  relative  to  the 
day  when  it is  uttered  (500  years  ago,  Raphael  was  born,  said  on  April 
6,  1983) .  This  convinced  me  at first,  but  I  now  think  we  must  be 
careful:  it is possible to  use  an  utterance  like  above  and  thereby 
imply  that today  is some  personality's  birthday,  but  only  if  the 
situation somehow  suggests  a  'birthday  context'  if  I  utter  the 
senten  ce  after a  glance  at the  newspaper,  e.g.,  my  interlocutor  may 
infer that  I  just gleaned this  very  specific  information  there.  The 
temporal  expression  by  itself,  however,  will  suggest  a  reference  point 49 
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no  smaller than  the  current  calendar  year;  if there is  no  element  in 
the  context  to  suggest  a  concern  with  birthdays,  all  I  can  claim  to 
have  informed  my  interlocutor of is that  it's  the  500th  anniversary 
this year.  (When  I  asked  a  friend,  a  few  days  ago ,  i .e.  in April  1992, 
if he  could  help  me  remember  a  famous  person  who  was  born  500  years 
ago ,  the  reply  was :  "You  mean  exactly  500  years?  1492?  Or 
approximately ...  ?". ) 
6.  Deictic  "egocentricity"  and  "subjectivity". 
1  Cf.  Lyons  1982,  Levinson  1988:184. 
7.  Deixis  and  the  definition  of the  speech  situation. 
1  Even  where  what  is represented is a  relatively  static  state  of 
affairs  - a  linguistic rule,  a  given  equilibrium of geological  forces, 
etc.  - it may  be  referred to  as  "the situation"  when  evaluated  by  an 
interested  party  under  the  point  of  view  of  its  relevance  to  some 
concern,  some  open  question  or  decision,  cure  of  action,  step  of 
argumentation. 
2  I  hold  that  elements  of  interactional  tension  are  always 
traceable,  in  subtle  cues,  even  in  utterances  that  form  part  of 
abstract  treatises  and  the  like.  I  should  like  to  take  the 
opportunity  here to correct amistake  in  t he  printed  version  of  Fuchs 
1991,  where,  in the  same  vein,  I  had  written: 
"In  an  important  but  easily  overlooked  sense,  the relevance  of  any 
predication is  'episodal',  since  any  predication  is  an  event,  a 
change-of-situation,  in  an  interactional episode  and  is  evaluated 
for its relevance to the situation at that point."  (Fuchs  1991:102) 
Unfortunately,  one  of the  editors substituted  her  views  to mine  at this 
point,  without  consulting  me ,  and  changed  the  statement to  " ...  may  be 
'episodal' ...  ",  " ...  may  be  an  event ...  ",  " ...  may  be  evaluated . . . ".  This 
distorts  the  overall  systematics  and  leads  to  a  number  of 
contradictions within the  paper. 
8.  Deictic  projection. 
1  What  follows  is just an  introduction to and  outline of section  8 
as  projected;  cf.  t he  first  note to section  1. 
2  Cf.  also  the  expressions  described  in Allen/HilI  1979 . 
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